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709 
REMEDYING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
THROUGH DNA TESTING: EXPANDING 
POST-CONVICTION LITIGANTS’ ACCESS 
TO DNA DATABASE SEARCHES TO  
PROVE INNOCENCE 
Abstract: Forensic science is used as evidence in criminal cases regularly. Re-
cently, however, scientists have criticized several commonly used forensic meth-
ods that are unreliable, scientifically invalid, and have contributed to wrongful 
convictions. In contrast, DNA testing, which is reliable and valid, is a powerful 
resource for exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals. Congress and all fifty 
states have enacted statutes providing access to post-conviction DNA testing. On-
ly nine states, however, have enacted statutes granting post-conviction litigants 
access to another important resource—law enforcement DNA database searches. 
Even though Congress amended the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute 
to provide access to DNA database searches in 2016, only applicants incarcerated 
for federal offenses are eligible for relief under this statute. This Note argues that, 
to remedy wrongful convictions, all state legislatures should amend post-
conviction DNA testing statutes to provide access to DNA database searches. Al-
ternatively, Congress should amend the federal post-conviction DNA testing stat-
ute to provide post-conviction litigants wrongly convicted of state offenses with 
access to DNA database searches. 
INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of August 13, 1986, 31-year-old Christine Morton was 
found murdered in her bed in her home in Austin, Texas.1 Her attacker had 
used a wooden weapon to beat her to death while she was sleeping.2 Investiga-
tors suspected that Christine’s husband, 32-year-old Michael Morton, was her 
attacker, even though he did not have a criminal record or a history of vio-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Pamela Colloff, The Innocent Man, Part One, TEX. MONTHLY (Nov. 2012), https://www.
texasmonthly.com/politics/the-innocent-man-part-one [https://perma.cc/6KR7-HNZP]; Know the 
Cases: Michael Morton, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/michael-
morton [https://perma.cc/3QN4-QNVC]; Profile of Michael Morton, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERA-
TIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3834 [https://
perma.cc/MKD4-WCTA]. 
 2 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1; Michael Morton, TEX. MONTHLY, https://
www.texasmonthly.com/topics/michael-morton [https://perma.cc/MUT5-YG2S]. The attack happened 
sometime after 5:30am, when Christine’s husband, Michael Morton, left their house to go to his job as 
a supermarket manager. See Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. Their three-year-old son, 
Eric, was home and witnessed his mother’s murder. Id. 
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lence.3 On February 17, 1987, a jury convicted Morton for his wife’s murder, 
and he received a life sentence.4 It was not until twenty-four years later, in 
2011, that Morton finally obtained post-conviction DNA testing and a DNA 
database search, which proved his innocence.5 
Before Morton’s trial, the prosecution had discovered three pieces of evi-
dence that pointed toward Morton’s innocence.6 The prosecution, however, did 
not turn over any of this evidence to the defense at trial.7 First, the Mortons’ 
three-year-old son, Eric, who witnessed his mother’s murder, described the 
crime scene and murder to his grandmother in detail, telling her, “Daddy was 
not home” when the murder happened, and the murderer was a “monster” with 
a “big mustache,” not his father.8 Second, the Mortons’ neighbors told police 
that, several times, a man driving a green van parked near the Mortons’ house 
and then went into the woods.9 Third, Christine’s credit card went missing, and 
police found it in a jewelry store in San Antonio, Texas.10 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1; Michael Morton, supra note 2. On the evening 
of August 12, 1986, Morton, Christine, and their three-year-old son, Eric, went out to dinner at a res-
taurant to celebrate Morton’s birthday. Profile of Michael Morton, supra note 1. When they returned 
home that night, Christine declined sex with her husband. See Know the Cases: Michael Morton, 
supra note 1. When Morton left for work at 5:30am the next morning, he left a note for Christine on 
the counter in their bathroom. Id. In the note, Morton told Christine that he was upset that she had not 
wanted to be intimate with him, and he signed the note with “I love you.” Id. Based on the note, the 
prosecution theorized that Morton murdered his wife because she had declined to be intimate on his 
birthday. Id. 
 4 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. 
 5 Id. Throughout those twenty-four years, Morton always maintained his innocence. Michael 
Morton, supra note 2. 
 6 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. 
 7 Id. The trial judge ordered the prosecution to turn over all of the chief investigator’s reports, but 
none of the reports that the prosecution turned over to the defense contained this evidence. Id. During 
their post-conviction investigation, Morton’s attorneys filed a Public Information Act request and 
obtained the documents that the prosecution had withheld at trial. Id. The Texas Supreme Court or-
dered a Court of Inquiry to determine whether the prosecutor in Morton’s case, Ken Anderson, had 
committed misconduct. Id. The Court of Inquiry concluded that Anderson concealed exculpatory 
evidence and charged him with criminal contempt and evidence tampering. Id. 
 8 Id.; Michael Morton, supra note 2. Morton’s attorneys’ post-conviction investigation revealed 
that the prosecutor had a transcript of a conversation where Christine’s mother told an investigator 
about Eric’s account of the murder. Michael Morton, supra note 2. Post-conviction DNA testing and a 
DNA database search later identified the actual perpetrator, Mark Alan Norwood. Jason Kreag, Let-
ting Innocence Suffer: The Need for Defense Access to the Law Enforcement DNA Database, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 807 (2015); Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. Norwood wore a 
distinctive “horseshoe-shaped mustache that draped over his upper lip.” Pamela Colloff, The Guilty 
Man, TEX. MONTHLY (June 2013), https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/the-guilty-man [https://
perma.cc/AGB5-N52H]. 
 9 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. 
 10 Id. A San Antonio police officer was prepared to identify the woman who tried to use the credit 
card at the jewelry store, but the prosecution did not tell the defense about either the credit card or the 
officer’s identification. Id. 
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The police also had in their possession before Morton’s trial a fourth 
piece of evidence that pointed toward Morton’s innocence, but they did not 
understand its significance at that time.11 On the day after Christine’s murder, 
her brother, John Kirkpatrick, found a blue, blood-stained bandana at a con-
struction site approximately 100 yards from the Mortons’ home.12 Kirkpatrick 
gave the bloody bandana to the police, but they did not investigate it further.13 
This bloody bandana would exonerate Morton twenty-four years later.14 
At trial, the prosecution’s theory was that Morton beat his wife to death 
because of her refusal to have sex with him the night before the murder.15 The 
prosecution did not present any witnesses or physical evidence to support its 
theory.16 The jury convicted Morton despite the lack of evidence.17 
After several years of Morton requesting DNA testing, in 2010, an appel-
late court finally granted him post-conviction testing on both the bloody ban-
dana and hair found on it.18 In 2011, a laboratory found two profiles in the 
DNA from the bandana—Christine Morton’s DNA profile and the profile of an 
unknown male.19 Thus, DNA testing excluded Morton as the source of the 
DNA on the bandana, but the actual perpetrator was still unknown.20 Morton 
soon obtained a DNA database search, which identified convicted felon Mark 
Alan Norwood as the source of the male DNA on the bandana.21 The defense 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Colloff, supra note 1 (explaining that, after John Kirkpatrick turned over the bandana to the 
police, the police did not investigate it further, either because they did not understand its significance 
or because they ignored it); Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1 (stating that the police 
recovered the bandana prior to Morton’s trial, but the bandana was not tested until Morton requested 
post-conviction DNA testing). 
 12 Colloff, supra note 1; Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. 
 13 Colloff, supra note 1. 
 14 Kreag, supra note 8, at 807; Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. 
 15 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. Morton appealed his conviction, but the appellate court denied his appeal. Profile of Mi-
chael Morton, supra note 1. 
 18 Profile of Michael Morton, supra note 1. In 1990, Morton requested post-conviction DNA 
testing on a semen stain on the bedsheet from his and Christine’s bed, but the testing identified Mor-
ton as the source of the DNA. Id. Morton requested DNA testing on the bloody bandana and other 
evidence in 2005. Michael Morton, supra note 2; Profile of Michael Morton, supra note 1. The court 
granted DNA testing for some other items of evidence from the crime scene but not the bloody ban-
dana. Profile of Michael Morton, supra note 1. Some of that DNA testing was inconclusive, and none 
of it could rule out Morton as the source of DNA collected from his and Christine’s bed. Id. In 2010, 
Morton appealed the denial of his request for DNA testing on the bloody bandana, and the appellate 
court ordered the testing. Id. 
 19 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. The DNA testing indicated that the hair on the 
bandana belonged to Christine and that Christine’s blood was on the bandana. Profile of Michael 
Morton, supra note 1. 
 20 Kreag, supra note 8, at 806. 
 21 Id. at 807. Norwood was living in Texas when Christine was murdered in August 1986. Know the 
Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. He had been convicted of a felony in California, and he had a 
criminal record in Texas as well. Id. Law enforcement can collect convicted offenders’ DNA profiles and 
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and prosecution teams investigated Norwood, and they established not only 
that he murdered Christine Morton, but also that he murdered another woman, 
Debra Masters Baker.22 Morton was in prison at the time of Baker’s murder, 
meaning that, while Morton was wrongfully imprisoned for a crime that he did 
not commit, the actual perpetrator was free and committed another horrendous 
crime.23 
As a direct result of the DNA testing and DNA database search requested 
by Morton, he was able to pursue a claim of actual innocence in the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals.24 The district attorney agreed to release Morton on 
bond while his claim was pending, and on October 4, 2011, Morton was re-
leased from prison after serving nearly twenty-five years for a crime he did not 
commit.25 In a case similar to Morton’s, except for his access to the DNA data-
base, another wrongfully-convicted man was denied access to the database and 
served another seven years before being exonerated.26 
                                                                                                                           
enter them into DNA databases, so Norwood’s DNA profile may have been in the DNA database be-
cause it was entered in connection with one of his prior felony convictions. See FBI, NATIONAL DNA 
INDEX SYSTEM (NDIS) OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES MANUAL 27 (2017) [hereinafter NDIS MANUAL], 
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ndis-procedures-manual-ver4-approved-04272016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J322-TD97] (stating that the National DNA Index System (“NDIS”) contains the DNA profiles 
of convicted offenders as well as other types of DNA profiles); Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra 
note 1 (stating that Norwood was a convicted felon). 
 22 Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. Baker was murdered in Travis County, Texas 
two years after Christine’s murder. Id. Like Christine, Baker was beaten to death in her bed. Id. The 
investigation by Morton’s defense team and the Travis County District Attorney’s Office found that 
Norwood’s pubic hair had been recovered from the scene of Baker’s murder. Profile of Michael Mor-
ton, supra note 1. Norwood was charged with Christine’s murder in November 2011, and, in March 
2013, he was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. Id. In September 2016, Norwood was convict-
ed of Baker’s murder and given a second life sentence, to be served consecutively with his life sen-
tence for Christine’s murder. Brittany Glas, Mark Norwood Found Guilty of 2nd Murder, Sentenced to 
Life, KXAN (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.kxan.com/news/local/austin/closing-arguments-jury-
deliberation-expected-friday-in-norwood-trial-day-9/995007001 [https://perma.cc/ZY2T-MUV3]. 
 23 See Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1 (stating that Baker was murdered while 
Morton was in prison). Had Norwood been identified as the true murder and convicted instead of 
Morton in 1987, Norwood would not have had the opportunity to murder Baker. See id. 
 24 Pamela Colloff, The Innocent Man, Part Two, TEX. MONTHLY (Dec. 2012), https://www.texas
monthly.com/articles/the-innocent-man-part-two [https://perma.cc/L9FM-RV9A]. 
 25 Id.; Know the Cases: Michael Morton, supra note 1. For Morton’s memoir describing his 
wrongful conviction and exoneration, see generally MICHAEL MORTON, GETTING LIFE: AN INNO-
CENT MAN’S 25-YEAR JOURNEY FROM PRISON TO PEACE: A MEMOIR (2015). 
 26 Kreag, supra note 8, at 807–08, 807 n.7 (stating that the Texas DNA database administrator 
denied Rickey Dale Wyatt’s request to access the DNA database in March 2005); id. at 808 n.9 (stat-
ing that Wyatt’s conviction was vacated and he was released from prison in May 2012). See generally 
Know the Cases: Rickey Dale Wyatt, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/
rickey-dale-wyatt [https://perma.cc/S9EK-CFK5] (describing the case of Rickey Dale Wyatt); Profile 
of Rickey Dale Wyatt, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3973 [https://perma.cc/W5BV-KYXV] (describing the case 
of Rickey Dale Wyatt). In 1981, Wyatt was convicted of aggravated rape and sentenced to ninety-nine 
years in prison. Wyatt v. State, No. 05-04-01345-CR, 2005 WL 729960, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 
2005); see also Kreag, supra note 8, at 807; Know the Cases: Rickey Dale Wyatt, supra. A trial court 
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Between 1989 and the end of 2018, in the United States, 2,360 wrongful-
ly convicted individuals were exonerated after spending an average of 8.7 
years in prison for crimes they did not commit.27 Several factors cause wrong-
ful convictions: mistaken eyewitness identifications; false confessions; false 
informant testimony; police and prosecutorial misconduct; ineffective assis-
tance of defense counsel; and flawed forensic science.28 Flawed forensic sci-
ence, in particular, has played a role in nearly one-quarter of all recorded 
                                                                                                                           
denied Wyatt’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing in 2004, and an appellate court affirmed the 
denial on appeal. Wyatt, 2005 WL 729960, at *1, *4. Eventually, Wyatt obtained DNA testing, but the 
DNA evidence from the victim’s sexual assault kit had degraded over time, and the laboratory could 
only identify a partial DNA profile. Kreag, supra note 8, at 807. The partial DNA profile, however, 
excluded Wyatt as a source of the DNA in the sexual assault kit. Id. Nevertheless, the Texas DNA 
database administrator denied Wyatt’s request for a DNA database search because the partial profile 
did not satisfy the requirements for a search. Id. at 807–08. Without the DNA database search, Wyatt 
could not identify the actual perpetrator of the crime he was wrongfully convicted of. Id. at 808. Wy-
att’s conviction was not overturned until 2012, after he had already served thirty-one years. See Ex 
parte Wyatt, No. AP-76797, 2012 WL 1647004 (Tex. Crim. App. May 9, 2012) (overturning Wyatt’s 
conviction); see also Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 n.9 (stating that Wyatt’s conviction was overturned). 
The district attorney re-investigated Wyatt’s case and dismissed the original indictment in 2014 based 
on his innocence. Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 n.9; see Robert Wilonsky, Dallas Man Who Served 31 
Years in Prison for a Rape He Didn’t Commit Finally Declared Innocent, DALL. MORNING NEWS 
CRIME BLOG (Dec. 2014), https://crimeblog.dallasnews.com/2014/12/dallas-man-who-served-31-
years-in-prison-for-a-rape-he-didnt-commit-finally-declared-innocent.html [https://perma.cc/LA6U-
72Z6] (reporting on Wyatt’s release from prison). Had Wyatt been permitted to search the DNA data-
base, he might have been exonerated earlier. See Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 n.9 (explaining that pro-
gress in Wyatt’s case was delayed because he could not search the DNA database). 
 27 Exonerations in the United States, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerations-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx [https://perma.cc/
XBN2-8R6H?type=image]. Wrongful conviction is defined as “[a] conviction of a person for a crime 
that he or she did not commit” or “[b]roadly, a conviction that has been overturned or vacated by an 
appellate court.” Conviction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In this Note, the term 
“wrongful conviction” refers to the first definition. Id. To exonerate is “[t]o clear of all blame; to offi-
cially declare (a person) to be free of guilt.” Exonerate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
Exculpate means “[t]o be free from blame or accusation; esp., to prove not guilty.” Exculpate, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 28 James R. Acker et al., Stepping Back—Moving Beyond Immediate Causes: Criminal Justice 
and Wrongful Convictions in Social Context, in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING 
BACK, MOVING FORWARD 6 (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014); see Exonerations in the United 
States, supra note 27 (listing “mistaken identification,” “false confession,” “bad forensic evidence,” 
“perjury/false accusation,” and “official misconduct” as contributing factors in the cases of exonerees 
included in the database). See generally EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS: STEPPING BACK, 
MOVING FORWARD (Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014) (discussing several causes of wrongful con-
victions, including not only the aforementioned factors but also social factors, including racial bias, 
and psychological factors as well); BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIM-
INAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011) (examining the causes of wrongful convictions). Prosecu-
tors’ use of defendants’ prior criminal convictions to impeach them at trial, although allowed under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609, may also contribute to wrongful convictions. Anna Roberts, Impeach-
ment by Unreliable Conviction, 55 B.C. L. REV. 563, 578 (2014); Ric Simmons, An Empirical Study 
of Rule 609 and Suggestions for Practical Reform, 59 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1008 (2018). Additionally, 
prosecutors’ self-interest may contribute to wrongful convictions. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, 
Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 481 (2017). 
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wrongful convictions.29 Since the development of DNA testing in the mid-
1980s, it has become an important resource for exonerating wrongfully con-
victed individuals.30 For some exonerees, like Morton, however, exculpatory 
DNA testing results alone have not been sufficient to establish innocence.31 
Morton was not exonerated until a search of a law enforcement DNA database 
identified the actual perpetrator of the crime.32 
All fifty states and Congress have enacted post-conviction DNA testing 
statutes.33 Only nine state statutes and the federal statute, however, contain 
provisions allowing post-conviction litigants access to DNA database search-
es.34 Without statutory access, post-conviction litigants’ access is left to the 
discretion of the law enforcement agencies that control the DNA databases.35 
Although some agencies may agree to a DNA database search, there is no 
guarantee that all post-conviction litigants will be granted a search like Morton 
was granted.36 
                                                                                                                           
 29 % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.
law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx [https://perma.
cc/TSQ8-QU9D]. See generally GARRETT, supra note 28, at 84–117 (examining the role of flawed 
forensic science in wrongful convictions). 
 30 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 812 (explaining that DNA testing helps solve crimes); Michael P. 
Luongo, Post-Conviction Due Process Right to Access DNA Evidence: District Attorney’s Office v. 
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009), 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 130, 131 (2010) (explain-
ing the value of DNA testing in criminal cases). See generally GARRETT, supra note 28 (examining 
the wrongful conviction cases of the first 250 DNA exonerees). There have been 350 DNA exonera-
tions in the United States to date. DNA Exonerations Database, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT, https://
www.convictingtheinnocent.com [https://perma.cc/57WZ-HGNT]. 
 31 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 806–07 (explaining that, after he obtained exculpatory post-
conviction DNA testing, Michael Morton still needed access to search a DNA database in order to 
identify the actual perpetrator and prove his innocence). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Kreag, supra note 8, at 808; Ethan Bronner, Lawyers, Saying DNA Cleared Inmate, Pursue 
Access to Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2013, at A1, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/us/lawyers-
saying-dna-cleared-inmate-pursue-access-to-data.html [https://perma.cc/9B5R-G9EQ]; see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3600(e) (Supp. IV 2016) (providing for post-conviction DNA testing under federal law). For a list of 
all fifty states’ post-conviction DNA testing statutes, see Post-Conviction Relief Through DNA Test-
ing, 0030 SURVEYS 21 (West 2017). 
 34 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e); Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 757, 779 (2015); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 & n.13; Bronner, supra note 33. The nine 
states are Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Texas. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-412(9) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(9) (2017); 725 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(2) (West 2017); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(10) (2017); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-a(c) (McKinney 2017); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (West 2017); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.035 (West 2017); see also Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 n.13; Bronner, supra 
note 33. 
 35 Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09. 
 36 See id. (explaining that, in the absence of statutes granting post-conviction litigants access to 
DNA database searches, law enforcement agencies have discretion to decide whether to grant access). 
For example, law enforcement refused a DNA database search in Rickey Dale Wyatt’s case. See id. at 
807–08 (explaining the Texas DNA database administrator’s denial of Wyatt’s request for a DNA 
2019] Expanding Post-Conviction Access to DNA Databases 715 
This Note examines the role of flawed forensic science in wrongful con-
victions and the importance of access to post-conviction DNA testing and 
DNA database searches to exonerate wrongfully convicted individuals.37 Part I 
of this Note provides an overview of flawed forensic science, the development 
of DNA testing, and the creation of DNA databases.38 Part II explains the im-
portance of DNA database searches following post-conviction DNA testing to 
prove innocence.39 Part II also analyzes state and federal statutes granting de-
fendants access to DNA database searches.40 Finally, Part III argues that all 
state legislatures should amend their post-conviction DNA testing statutes to 
provide post-conviction litigants with access to DNA database searches.41 Al-
ternatively, Part III argues that Congress should amend the federal post-
conviction DNA testing statute to provide applicants wrongly convicted of 
state offenses with access to DNA database searches under the federal stat-
ute.42 
I. THE ROLE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE IN WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
Forensic science can help solve crimes, but it has also contributed to the 
wrongful convictions of hundreds of innocent individuals.43 The forensic fea-
                                                                                                                           
database search); supra note 26 (describing the case of Rickey Dale Wyatt, who was wrongfully con-
victed of aggravated rape and obtained exculpatory DNA testing results but was not allowed access to 
search any DNA databases). Both Morton and Wyatt were wrongfully convicted in Texas, demon-
strating that different post-conviction litigants in the same state can receive different results. See 
Kreag, supra note 8, at 806–08 (describing the cases of Morton and Wyatt). It is important to note, 
however, that the Texas DNA database administrator’s decision not to allow Wyatt a database search 
was not arbitrary. See id. 807, 808, 808–09 (stating the reason for the database administrator’s denial). 
Rather, the DNA database administer did provide an explanation for the denial—that the DNA testing 
resulted in a partial profile, and the partial profile did not meet the criteria that DNA database require 
to conduct a search. Id. at 808. As this Note explains in Part I.B.2.a., however, even though a partial 
profile does not meet the requirements established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for a 
search of the National DNA Index System (“NDIS”), it is still possible to perform a different type of 
DNA database search called a “keyboard search.” Id. at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 
50–51 (explaining the requirements for a keyboard search of a partial DNA profile). Although a regu-
lar search of a DNA database requires uploading a complete profile for permanent addition to the 
DNA database, a keyboard search allows a DNA database administrator to manually enter a partial 
profile for a one-time search of the DNA database without uploading it permanently. Kreag, supra 
note 8, at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing keyboard searches of partial DNA 
profiles). 
 37 See infra notes 43–204 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 43–117 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 118–204 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 118–204 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 205–236 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 205–236 and accompanying text. 
 43 See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 6–7 (examining the first 250 DNA exonerations and the causes 
of the associated wrongful convictions, including flawed forensic science); Theodore Tibbits, Note, 
Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing: Why Massachusetts’s 278A Statute Should Be the Model for 
the Future, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 355, 360 (2016) (explaining that flawed forensic science tech-
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ture-comparison methods, in particular, are unreliable and scientifically inva-
lid.44 DNA testing, however, is scientifically valid and reliable, and DNA test-
ing has exonerated 350 wrongfully convicted individuals.45 Law enforcement 
agencies have created DNA databases containing DNA profiles collected from 
known individuals and unsolved crimes.46 Although a DNA database search 
can help prove a wrongfully convicted individual’s innocence by identifying 
the actual perpetrator of the crime, not all post-conviction litigants have access 
to search these databases.47 
This Part provides background information on the role of forensic science 
in wrongful convictions.48 Section A discusses flawed forensic science meth-
ods, which contributed to wrongful conviction in nearly one quarter of all ex-
onerations in the United States since 1989.49 Section B discusses the develop-
ment of DNA testing and the creation of searchable DNA databases—both ef-
fective resources for remedying wrongful convictions.50 
                                                                                                                           
niques have contributed to wrongful convictions, and that DNA testing has helped exonerate some of 
these wrongfully convicted individuals); % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, supra note 29 
(showing that flawed forensic science was present in nearly one-quarter of all known wrongful con-
victions in the United States since 1989). 
 44 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7–8 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. The President’s 
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) defines the forensic “feature-
comparison” methods as methods involving looking for physical similarities between pieces of crime-
scene evidence and samples collected from suspects. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: PRESI-
DENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: FO-
RENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON 
METHODS 1 (2016) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT], https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TY8-
7A2F]. Examples of forensic feature-comparison methods include comparisons of “hair, latent finger-
prints, firearms and spent ammunition, toolmarks and bitemarks, shoeprints and tiretracks, and hand-
writing.” Id. The forensic feature-comparison methods are unreliable because their results are neither 
“consistent [n]or accurate.” See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 86 (defining unreliability and characteriz-
ing feature-comparison methods as unreliable). 
 45 NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 7; DNA Exonerations Database, supra note 30; see infra notes 
72–81 and accompanying text (describing DNA testing methods). 
 46 Kreag, supra note 8, at 812, 815. There is a federal DNA database as well as state and local 
DNA databases. Id. at 812–13; see infra notes 82–117 and accompanying text (describing DNA data-
bases). 
 47 Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09; see, e.g., supra note 26 (describing the case of Rickey Dale 
Wyatt, who was wrongfully convicted of aggravated rape and obtained exculpatory DNA testing re-
sults but was not allowed access to search any DNA databases). 
 48 See infra notes 51–117 and accompanying text. 
 49 See infra notes 51–66 and accompanying text. 
 50 See infra notes 67–117 and accompanying text. 
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A. Flawed Forensic Science 
Forensic science is the application of scientific techniques to help solve 
crimes.51 Some forensic methods, such as serology (blood type testing) and 
DNA testing, are reliable and scientifically valid and thus are helpful in an-
swering legal questions.52 In 2009, however, the National Academy of Scienc-
es (“NAS”) released a report criticizing other commonly used forensic meth-
ods that have not been proven scientifically valid.53 Courts have admitted tes-
timony based on unreliable forensic methods in some cases because the stand-
ards for admitting scientific evidence construct an analysis that is flexible, 
gives discretion to trial judges, and has failed to exclude this evidence.54 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 85 (defining forensic science as “the use of science to help 
answer legal questions”); Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic 
Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 149, 152 (2008) (stat-
ing that “forensic science is routinely defined as ‘the application of science to problems of law’”). The 
legal definition of forensic science is: 
A broad range of evidence-related disciplines, some laboratory-based (as with nuclear 
and mitochondrial-DNA analysis, toxicology, and drug analysis), others based on inter-
pretation of observed patterns (as with fingerprints, writing samples, tool marks, bite 
marks, and specimens), and still others based on a combination of experiential and sci-
entific analysis (as with explosive and fire-debris analysis, blood-spatter analysis). 
Forensic Science, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 52 See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 86, 94 (describing serology as a reliable method); NAS RE-
PORT, supra note 44, at 7–8, 40–41 (describing DNA testing as the only consistently accurate and 
reliable forensic method); Tibbits, supra note 43, at 361 (stating that DNA testing and serology have 
“sound scientific bases”). A forensic method is unreliable if its results are neither consistent nor accu-
rate. GARRETT, supra note 28, at 86. Serology is also referred to as ABO blood-typing. Id. Each per-
son has one of the four blood types—either A, B, AB, or O—and a person’s blood type remains the 
same throughout his or her entire life. Id. In a serological analysis, a forensic examiner performs a 
chemical test to determine the blood type of a sample, and the results are objective, not based on the 
examiner’s subjective opinion. Id. When a forensic examiner compares a suspect’s blood type to the 
blood type of a bodily fluid from a crime scene, such as blood or semen, the examiner concludes that 
the suspect is either included or excluded as a possible contributor to the sample. Id. Using databases, 
the examiner can determine the frequency of each blood type in the population and thus determine 
what percentage of the population shares the suspect’s blood type. Id. If the suspect shares the same 
blood type as the crime-scene sample, not only is the suspect included as a possible contributor, but 
the percentage of the world’s population that shares the suspect’s blood type is also included as a 
possible contributor. Id. 
 53 NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 111–82. In contrast to serology, the forensic feature-
comparison methods, such as hair microscopy, do not produce consistent and accurate results because 
they are based on forensic examiners’ personal opinions, and examiners’ opinions vary. GARRETT, 
supra note 28, at 86; see supra note 52 (describing serology, which is reliable). 
 54 NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 85–111; see FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 592–94 (1993). The admission of unreliable forensic evidence has 
contributed to several wrongful convictions. See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 85–101 (examining 
flawed forensic evidence admitted in wrongful conviction cases); % Exonerations by Contributing 
Factor, supra note 29 (showing that flawed forensic science was present in nearly one-quarter of all 
known wrongful convictions in the United States since 1989). The standard for admitting scientific 
expert witness testimony is Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which the United States Supreme Court 
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As of December 20, 2018, there have been 2,360 exonerations in the 
United States since 1989.55 In each case, an innocent defendant was wrongful-
ly convicted for a crime that he or she did not commit.56 Bad forensic evidence 
was a contributing factor in 552 (23%) of these cases.57 The incidence of 
flawed forensic science is even higher for DNA exonerations, which usually 
are rape and rape-murder cases, where biological evidence is common.58 
In 2005, in the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act of 2006, Congress gave the NAS permission to conduct a 
forensic science study previously recommended in a Senate Report.59 In the 
                                                                                                                           
held, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993, incorporates a flexible reliability 
standard. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 592–94. Even though both Rule 702 and 
Daubert instruct courts to consider the reliability of scientific methods, because the Daubert standard 
is flexible, judges have discretion and may admit evidence based on unreliable forensic methods. See 
NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 85–111; see also FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 592–
94. 
 55 Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27. The National Registry of Exonerations 
(“Registry”), founded in 2012, provides information about all United States exonerations since 1989 
with the goal of preventing future wrongful convictions. NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS: 
OUR MISSION, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx [https://perma.cc/
24CE-MW9C]. The Newkirk Center for Science & Society at University of California Irvine, the 
University of Michigan Law School, and Michigan State University College of Law maintain the 
Registry. Id. The Registry defines exoneration as “occur[ring] when a person who has been convicted 
of a crime is officially cleared based on new evidence of innocence.” Glossary, NAT’L REGISTRY OF 
EXONERATIONS https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx [https://perma.
cc/QDV9-ZJH4]. Specifically, any of the following qualifies as exoneration: (1) a government official 
or agency declares the person “factually innocent”; or (2) a court or government official removes the 
conviction by (i) granting a full pardon, (ii) acquitting the person of the charges, or (iii) dismissing the 
charges. Id. 
 56 Glossary, supra note 55. Of the 2,360 exonerees included in the Registry as of December 20, 
2018, 2,147 (91%) are male, and 213 (9%) are female. Exonerations in the United States, supra note 
27. On average, each exoneree lost 8.7 years of his or her life to wrongful conviction. Id. 
 57 % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, supra note 29. Other causes of wrongful conviction 
include mistaken eyewitness identification, false confessions, informant testimony, police and prose-
cutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. See generally GARRETT, supra note 28 
(examining the causes of wrongful conviction, including flawed forensic science, in the first 250 DNA 
exonerations). In some cases, more than one factor contributed to a wrongful conviction. See % Exon-
erations by Contributing Factor, supra note 29 (showing that the sum of the percentages of cases 
involving each factor add up to greater than 100%, because some cases involved more than one fac-
tor). 
 58 See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 5 (explaining that, out of the first 250 DNA exonerations, the 
most common crimes were rape, rape-murder, and murder, whereas other crimes, like robbery, were 
much less common); id. at 12 (stating that DNA is not present at the scenes of most crimes but is more 
commonly present at the scenes of rapes); id. at 263 (stating that DNA testing is typically performed 
in rape cases, and DNA exonerations are usually rape and rape-murder cases); id. at 271 (explaining 
that DNA testing is not possible in cases involving crimes like robbery because robbers rarely leave 
biological material at the crime scene). 
 59 NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 1; see Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agen-
cies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (2005); H.R. REP. NO. 109-272, 
at 121 (2005) (Conf. Rep.); S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46 (2005). According to the Senate Report, the 
Senate believed that substantial analysis had been conducted regarding laboratories’ needs for re-
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fall of 2006, pursuant to that congressional authorization, the NAS established 
the Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science Community to 
conduct the study.60 In 2009, the NAS released its report—Strengthening Fo-
rensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (“NAS Report”)—
summarizing its findings on the current state of forensic science in the United 
States and providing thirteen recommendations for improvements necessary to 
achieve best practices.61 Regarding the current state of forensic science, the 
                                                                                                                           
sources and guidance in order to perform DNA testing, but there had been only minimal analysis of 
other aspects of forensic science. S. REP. NO. 109-88, at 46. The Senate Report directed the NAS to 
establish an independent Forensic Science Committee comprised of members of the forensic science 
community, including forensic scientists, medical examiners, members of the legal community, and 
other scientists. Id. The Senate Report instructed the Forensic Science Committee to: 
(1) assess the present and future resource needs of the forensic science community, to 
include State and local crime labs, medical examiners, and coroners; (2) make recom-
mendations for maximizing the use of forensic technologies and techniques to solve 
crimes, investigate deaths, and protect the public; (3) identify potential scientific ad-
vances that may assist law enforcement in using forensic technologies and techniques to 
protect the public; (4) make recommendations for programs that will increase the num-
ber of qualified forensic scientists and medical examiners available to work in public 
crime laboratories; (5) disseminate best practices and guidelines concerning the collec-
tion and analysis of forensic evidence to help ensure quality and consistency in the use 
of forensic technologies and techniques to solve crimes, investigate deaths, and protect 
the public; (6) examine the role of the forensic community in the homeland security 
mission; (7) [examine] interoperability of Automated Fingerprint Information Systems 
[(“AFIS”)]; and (8) examine additional issues pertaining to forensic science as deter-
mined by the Committee. 
Id.; see NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 1–2. 
 60 NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 2. The Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic 
Science Community was composed of members representing the forensic science community, the 
legal community, and other scientific disciplines, such as biology, chemistry, and statistics. Id. at v. 
The committee held eight two-day meetings during 2008, at which the committee’s members listened 
to expert testimony on a variety of forensic science issues and deliberated. Id. at 2–4. The committee’s 
goal was to provide recommendations to serve as a roadmap for future forensic science progress. Id. at 
xix. 
 61 See generally NAS REPORT, supra note 44. In its report, the NAS first recommended that Con-
gress establish the National Institute of Forensic Science (“NIFS”) “to support and oversee the foren-
sic science disciplines,” and then made twelve recommendations related to the proposed NIFS’s work. 
Id. at 19–33. The NAS noted that a broad range of disciplines fall within the term “forensic science,” 
and it adopted the National Institute of Justice’s (“NIJ”) categorization of forensic science disciplines: 
“(1) general toxicology; (2) firearms/toolmarks; (3) questioned documents; (4) trace evidence; (5) 
controlled substances; (6) biological/serology screening (including DNA analysis); (7) fire de-
bris/arson analysis; (8) impression evidence; (9) blood pattern analysis; (10) crime scene investiga-
tion; (11) medicolegal death investigation; and (12) digital evidence.” Id. at 38; Status and Needs of 
Forensic Science Service Providers: A Report to Congress, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE 3 (2004), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213420.pdf [https://perma.cc/JME7-FE3P]. The forensic science 
disciplines generally can be divided into two categories—laboratory-based disciplines and pattern-
interpretation-based disciplines. NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 38. The laboratory-based disciplines 
include nuclear DNA testing, mitochondrial DNA testing, toxicology, and drug analysis, whereas the 
pattern-interpretation-based disciplines include the analysis of fingerprints, writing samples, tool 
marks, and bite marks, as well as hair microscopy. Id.; see GARRETT, supra note 28, at 95 (describing 
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NAS Report concluded that DNA testing is the only forensic method that pro-
duces consistent results and has a high degree of certainty.62 In contrast, other 
common forensic methods, including the forensic feature-comparison methods, 
are not supported by sufficiently rigorous scientific studies, and thus they are 
unreliable and scientifically invalid.63 
The term “forensic feature-comparison method” refers to any forensic 
method where an examiner compares the features of two items of forensic evi-
dence next to each other, often under a microscope, and reaches a subjective 
conclusion, deciding whether the items are consistent or inconsistent with each 
other, entirely based on the examiner’s opinion.64 Examples of forensic fea-
ture-comparison methods include hair microscopy, fiber comparison, bite mark 
comparison, fingerprint comparison, tool mark comparison, bullet casing com-
parison, shoe print comparison, and voice comparison.65 Because these flawed 
forensic methods are unreliable, they have produced inaccurate results in some 
cases and contributed to wrongful convictions.66 
                                                                                                                           
hair microscopy as looking through a microscope to compare crime-scene hairs against hairs from 
victims and suspects). The pattern-interpretation based disciplines are also called the forensic “fea-
ture-comparison” methods. See PCAST REPORT, supra note 44, at 1 (defining the forensic “feature-
comparison” methods). 
 62 NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 7; Keith A. Findley, Reforming the ‘Science’ in Forensic Sci-
ence, WIS. LAW. (Nov. 2015), https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/
Article.aspx?Volume=88&Issue=10&ArticleID=24435 [https://perma.cc/8LTG-8XMU]. 
 63 See NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 7 (stating that DNA testing is the only forensic method that 
has been shown to be consistently accurate and reliable); Findley, supra note 62 (stating that the NAS 
concluded in its report that most forensic methods, except DNA testing, are “fundamentally unscien-
tific”). 
 64 GARRETT, supra note 28, at 85–86, 95. For instance, in hair microscopy, an analyst might 
compare under a microscope a pubic hair collected from the scene of a rape to a reference sample of 
the suspected perpetrator’s pubic hair. See id. (describing hair microscopy). 
 65 Id. at 85, 90. Each of these methods involves comparing two items side-by-side. Id. at 85. 
 66 Id. at 90 (explaining that many exonerees’ convictions were “based on forensic methods that 
were unreliable”); see % Exonerations by Contributing Factor, supra note 29 (showing that flawed 
forensic science was present in nearly one-quarter of all known wrongful convictions in the United 
States since 1989). See generally GARRETT, supra note 28, at 84–117 (examining flawed forensic 
science in 250 DNA exonerations). In response to the exonerations of three men convicted based on 
flawed hair microscopy, the FBI began reviewing cases where its analysts testified about hair micros-
copy. FBI Testimony on Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases 
in Ongoing Review, FBI (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-
testimony-on-microscopic-hair-analysis-contained-errors-in-at-least-90-percent-of-cases-in-ongoing-
review [https://perma.cc/QWA6-H5QG]. The FBI began its review in 2012, and in 2015, the agency 
admitted that its analysts’ testimony about microscopic hair comparison was flawed. FBI Testimony 
on Microscopic Hair Analysis Contained Errors in at Least 90 Percent of Cases in Ongoing Review, 
supra; Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-
all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/UTS5-KH3T]; Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Dept., FBI to Review Use of Forensic Evi-
dence in Thousands of Cases, WASH. POST (July 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
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B. The Development of DNA Testing and DNA Databases 
In contrast to the forensic feature-comparison methods, DNA testing is 
scientifically valid and reliable.67 Unlike the forensic feature-comparison 
methods, which have contributed to wrongful convictions, DNA testing has 
remedied 350 wrongful convictions since 1989.68 Not only have scientists im-
proved DNA testing techniques over time, but law enforcement agencies have 
created DNA databases to expand the ability of DNA testing to identify perpe-
trators and solve crimes.69 These databases contain the DNA profiles of known 
offenders as well as profiles collected from the scenes of unsolved crimes.70 
The databases have search functions, allowing law enforcement to compare 
new DNA profiles against the DNA profiles stored in the databases.71 
1. DNA Testing 
The current standard for DNA profiling is a DNA testing technique called 
polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”).72 Scientists developed PCR in the mid-
1980s, and in 1989, PCR-based DNA testing was used for the first time to ex-
onerate a wrongfully convicted person, Gary Dotson.73 The PCR technique can 
                                                                                                                           
local/crime/justice-dept-fbi-to-review-use-of-forensic-evidence-in-thousands-of-cases/2012/07/10/
gJQAT6DlbW_story.html [https://perma.cc/3LXA-H4EP]. 
 67 NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 7; Findley, supra note 62. DNA, which stands for deoxyribo-
nucleic acid, makes up the human genetic code. LISA R. KREEGER & DANIELLE M. WEISS, AM. 
PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., FORENSIC DNA FUNDAMENTALS FOR THE PROSECUTOR: BE NOT 
AFRAID 3 (2003). Each DNA molecule is composed of several nucleotides. Id. There are four differ-
ent nucleotides, also called “bases,” which are adenine (A), cytosine (C), guanine (G), and thymine 
(T). Id. at 3–4. Human beings share 99.99% of their DNA, but the other 0.01% of a person’s DNA is 
different in every individual (except for identical twins, who share 100% of their DNA). Id. at 3–4. 
 68 DNA Exonerations Database, supra note 30 (cataloging the 350 DNA exonerations to date and 
listing the earliest year of exoneration as 1989). See generally GARRETT, supra note 28 (examining 
the cases of 250 DNA exonerations). 
 69 Kreag, supra note 8, at 812–14. 
 70 Id. at 815–16. 
 71 Id. at 816. 
 72 KREEGER & WEISS, supra note 67, at 9; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE 
FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORK-
ING GROUP 17 (2011) [hereinafter DOJ PREDICTIONS], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183697.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6TD6-JM2V]; Luongo, supra note 30, at 130. The PCR technique is capable of 
replicating a small sample of DNA until there is enough to be analyzed. KREEGER & WEISS, supra 
note 67, at 8–9. Before PCR was developed, a different DNA profiling technique, called Restriction 
Fragment Length Polymorphism (“RFLP”) was used. Luongo, supra note 30, at 130; Tibbits, supra 
note 43, at 363. British geneticist Sir Alec John Jeffreys and his colleagues developed the RFLP DNA 
profiling method in 1985. DOJ PREDICTIONS, supra, at 14; Luongo, supra note 30, at 130; Tibbits, 
supra note 43, at 363; A.J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific ‘Fingerprints’ of Human DNA, 316 
NATURE 76, 76 (1985). When PCR was developed, it replaced RFLP as the standard for DNA profil-
ing. See Luongo, supra note 30, at 130 (explaining RFLP and PCR, and describing PCR as the current 
standard). 
 73 Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Con-
victions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009); Luongo, supra note 30, at 130; Rachel Steinback, The Fight for 
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be used on small and degraded DNA samples.74 This sensitivity is an important 
advantage over prior DNA testing techniques, especially in the post-conviction 
DNA testing context, where degraded samples are common.75 
Two types of PCR-based DNA typing are performed today—Short Tan-
dem Repeat (“STR”) and mitochondrial DNA (“mtDNA”) typing.76 Each tech-
nique evaluates a different type of DNA—the STR technique evaluates DNA 
from the cell’s nucleus, whereas mtDNA testing evaluates DNA from the cell’s 
mitochondria.77 The STR method can be used to obtain a DNA profile from 
                                                                                                                           
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Is Not Yet Over: An Analysis of the Eight Remaining “Holdout States” 
and Suggestions for Strategies to Bring Vital Relief to the Wrongfully Convicted, 98 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 329, 335 (2007); Tibbits, supra note 43, at 363. In July 1979, Gary Dotson was wrong-
fully convicted of rape and kidnapping in Cook County, Illinois and sentenced to twenty-five to fifty 
years in prison. Profile of Gary Dotson, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3186 [https://perma.cc/E6AZ-F2SA]. 
The victim was 16-year-old Cathleen Crowell. Id. On the night of July 9, 1977, Crowell told a police 
officer that she had been raped, and he took her to a hospital for an examination. Id. Crowell had su-
perficial cuts on her stomach, and there was semen on her underwear. Id. Police showed Crowell a 
book of mugshot photographs, and she identified 24-year-old Dotson’s photograph. Id. At trial, the 
only evidence against Dotson was Crowell’s identification of him and forensic testimony. Id. The 
forensic testimony was incorrect, but the defense did not challenge it, and the judge did not question 
it. Id. Several years later, in 1982, Crowell (now Cathleen Crowell Webb) and her husband, David 
Webb, moved to Jaffrey, New Hampshire. Id. In New Hampshire, in 1985, Webb told her pastor that 
she had invented the rape allegation against Dotson, and she felt guilty. Id. The truth was that she 
never had been raped. Id. In fact, she invented the rape story because she had sex with her boyfriend 
and feared that she would become pregnant. Id. She wanted to use the rape story to cover up a possi-
ble pregnancy by her boyfriend. Id. She did not, however, become pregnant by her boyfriend. Id. 
When Webb’s attorney found out that Webb had recanted, he contacted the prosecutors, but they 
claimed that Webb was lying. Id. In 1987, a new attorney took on Dotson’s case and asked Illinois 
Governor James A. Thompson to order DNA testing. Id. In 1988, DNA testing excluded Dotson as a 
source of the DNA in the semen stain on Webb’s underwear, and DNA testing positively included 
Webb’s former boyfriend as the source of the DNA. Id. On August 14, 1989, the prosecution joined 
Dotson’s motion to vacate his conviction. Id. On January 9, 2003, Dotson was granted a pardon based 
on innocence. Id. 
 74 KREEGER & WEISS, supra note 67, at 9; Luongo, supra note 30, at 130; Tibbits, supra note 43, 
at 364. In contrast, the previous method, RFLP, requires a larger amount of genetic material. Luongo, 
supra note 30, at 130; see Tibbits, supra note 43, at 364 (stating that PCR does not require as much 
DNA as RFLP requires). 
 75 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (explaining that DNA degrades over time, and when degraded 
DNA is tested, the resulting DNA profile may be partial, not complete); Luongo, supra note 30, at 130 
(stating that PCR “can be performed on samples that are too small or degraded for RFLP”). On aver-
age, wrongfully convicted individuals whose cases involved DNA lost 14.7 years to wrongful incar-
ceration, and some DNA exonerees lost thirty-five years or more. See Exonerations in the United 
States, supra note 27 (select “Present” next to “DNA” to filter for cases involving DNA)). Because 
post-conviction DNA testing is often performed many years after the crime was committed, it is 
common for DNA found on crime scene evidence to have degraded by the time it is tested. See Kreag, 
supra note 8, at 816 (stating that DNA degrades over time); Luongo, supra note 30, at 130 (stating 
that crime scene DNA samples are often degraded). 
 76 DOJ PREDICTIONS, supra note 72, at 17–19; KREEGER & WEISS, supra note 67, at 9, 11; Lu-
ongo, supra note 30, at 130–31. 
 77 DOJ PREDICTIONS, supra note 72, at 18; KREEGER & WEISS, supra note 67, at 11; Luongo, 
supra note 30, at 131. Mitochondria have their own DNA, which is different than the DNA in the 
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nearly all types of biological samples.78 The mtDNA testing method is useful 
to analyze evidence that is too degraded for STR analysis, because mitochon-
drial DNA is more stable than nuclear DNA.79 MtDNA testing is sometimes 
used on hair shafts.80 Not only is PCR-based DNA profiling commonly used 
today, but also, most importantly, unlike the forensic feature-comparison 
methods, PCR is scientifically valid and reliable.81 
2. DNA Databases 
In 1990, not long after scientists invented DNA testing, the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation (FBI) began creating and piloting the Combined DNA 
Index System (“CODIS”), which today supports a national network of DNA 
databases.82 Four years later, in 1994, Congress passed the DNA Identification 
Act (“DNA Act”), allowing the FBI to create a national DNA database.83 Un-
der the DNA Act, the national DNA database can contain the known-offender 
DNA profiles of convicted offenders and unknown-DNA profiles obtained 
                                                                                                                           
cell’s nucleus. DOJ PREDICTIONS, supra note 72, at 18; KREEGER & WEISS, supra note 67, at 11. 
MtDNA is found in blood, bodily fluids, hair, teeth, skin, bone, and muscle. KREEGER & WEISS, su-
pra note 67, at 11. Each individual inherits mtDNA from his or her mother, so mtDNA testing can 
trace maternal ancestry. Id. at 18. 
 78 See KREEGER & WEISS, supra note 67, at 7 (“Nuclear DNA is found in every cell and tissue of 
the body, except for red blood cells.”). A variation of STR testing, called “Y-STR” testing tests nucle-
ar DNA on the Y-chromosome only. See DOJ PREDICTIONS, supra note 72, at 19 (describing Y-STR 
testing). Although the STR technique can be used to evaluate both male and female DNA profiles, Y-
STR testing is only used for male profiles because it analyzes the Y chromosome, which is only pre-
sent in men. Id. Because each man inherits his Y chromosome from his father, Y-STR testing can also 
trace male ancestry. Id. at 19. 
 79 KREEGER & WEISS, supra note 67, at 12. 
 80 DOJ PREDICTIONS, supra note 72, at 18; Luongo, supra note 30, at 131. 
 81 See NAS REPORT, supra note 44, at 7 (concluding that DNA testing is the only forensic method 
that has been scientifically proven to be consistently accurate and reliable). 
 82 Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-
analysis/codis [https://perma.cc/GDL5-TA86]; see Kreag, supra note 8, at 812 (explaining that law 
enforcement began using DNA testing and creating a DNA database soon after DNA was discovered). 
“CODIS” refers to the FBI’s program and software that support DNA databases. Frequently Asked 
Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/
codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/WZK2-8MA9]. Sometimes, the term “CODIS” is 
also used to refer collectively to all of the DNA databases that participate in the FBI’s program. See 
id. (defining CODIS). During the pilot program in 1990, only fourteen state and local law enforce-
ment laboratories participated in the program. Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), supra. Today, 
more than 190 law enforcement agencies participate in the FBI’s DNA database program, and on the 
international level, more than fifty countries use the CODIS software for their DNA databases. Id. 
 83 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (1994); Kreag, supra note 8, at 812. The DNA Act is a subsection of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1992. See Kreag, supra note 8, at 813. As of 
September 1, 2017, the DNA Act has been moved to 34 U.S.C. § 12592. See 34 U.S.C.A. § 12592 
(West 2017). The official title of the DNA Act is “Index to facilitate law enforcement exchange of 
DNA identification information.” Id.; see also Kreag, supra note 8, at 813. 
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from crime scene evidence as well as other types of data.84 Congress intended 
for the DNA Act to help law enforcement identify criminal suspects and thus 
solve and prosecute crimes.85 In 2002, in United States v. Reynard, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of California noted that Congress 
also intended for the DNA database to make the criminal justice system more 
effective by reducing the possibility of law enforcement wrongly holding inno-
cent individuals.86 Consistent with these goals, law enforcement can search 
DNA databases whenever needed, such as during an investigation to try to 
identify a perpetrator whose DNA was collected from a crime scene.87 Even 
though one of its goals is avoiding the detention of innocent individuals, the 
DNA Act does not provide either pre-trial defendants or post-conviction liti-
gants access to DNA database searches.88 
Pursuant to the DNA Act, the FBI established the National DNA Index Sys-
tem (“NDIS”) in October 1998, and it continues to be used today.89 NDIS is a 
                                                                                                                           
 84 34 U.S.C. § 12592; see also Kreag, supra note 8, at 812. The DNA Act authorizes the FBI’s 
DNA database to include the following: (1) DNA profiles of convicted offenders, individuals charged 
with crimes in indictments or informations, and other individuals whose DNA samples were collected 
legally; (2) DNA profiles obtained from crime scenes; (3) DNA profiles collected from unidentified 
human remains; and (4) DNA profiles that relatives of missing persons volunteer. 34 U.S.C. 
§ 12592(a)(1)–(4). Indictments and informations are two types of charging instruments, or “formal 
legal documents by which a person can be officially charged with a crime.” Charging Instrument, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). An indictment is “[t]he formal written accusation of a 
crime, made by a grand jury and presented to a court for prosecution against the accused person.” 
Indictment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). An information is “[a] formal criminal 
charge made by a prosecutor without a grand-jury indictment.” Information, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 85 See Sandra J. Carnahan, The Supreme Court’s Primary Purpose Test: A Roadblock to the Na-
tional Law Enforcement DNA Database, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1, 28, 37–38 (2004); Kreag, supra note 8, at 
813; see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-900, pt. 1 (2000), as reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2323. 
 86 United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1161 (2002) (stating that Congress intended 
for the DNA database to “increase the efficacy of the criminal justice system by ‘eliminat[ing] the 
prospect that innocent individuals w[ill] be wrongly held for crimes that they did not commit’”) (quot-
ing 146 CONG. REC. H8572-01, at H8575); Kreag, supra note 8, at 813 n.32. 
 87 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (stating that “the quintessential goal” of DNA databases is “to 
help law enforcement solve cases by linking DNA profiles from known individuals to DNA profiles 
from unsolved crimes”). 
 88 See NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 32 (stating that the Federal DNA Act does not give de-
fendants permission to search DNA databases); David H. Kaye, Trawling DNA Databases for Partial 
Matches: What Is the FBI Afraid Of?, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 167 (2009) (stating that 
the DNA Identification Act of 1994 does not give a defendant access to DNA profiles unrelated to his 
or her case); Kreag, supra note 8, at 814 (stating that the DNA Identification Act does not give de-
fendants authorization to search DNA databases themselves). 
 89 Kreag, supra note 8, at 812; Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 82; 
see CODIS BROCHURE, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/combined-dna-index-system-codis-
brochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/9STY-4R6E]; NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 4. As of December 
2018, NDIS contains the DNA profiles of more than 13,566,716 offenders and more than 3,323,611 
arrestees. CODIS—NDIS Statistics, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/
codis/ndis-statistics [https://perma.cc/3Q3K-S5KV]. 
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national DNA database that is part of CODIS, and it includes DNA profiles con-
tributed not only by federal forensic laboratories, but also state and local forensic 
laboratories as well.90 The federal government, all fifty states, the District of Co-
lumbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory all 
contribute to NDIS.91 Additionally, local and state law enforcement agencies 
also operate their own DNA databases independent from the FBI’s NDIS.92 Less 
is known about these databases, because, unlike NDIS, their operational regula-
tions are not available to the public.93 All of the databases, however, are main-
tained by law enforcement agencies, and post-conviction litigants can search the 
databases only if a database administrator, a court, or a statute provides access.94 
3. Searching the National DNA Index System 
NDIS contains both known-offender DNA profiles from convicted of-
fenders and unknown-DNA profiles from unsolved crimes.95 Law enforcement 
agencies enter DNA profiles from crime scenes into the database as they are 
collected, and, on a weekly basis, NDIS automatically compares these crime-
scene DNA profiles to the known-offender and unknown-DNA profiles stored 
in the database.96 Law enforcement agencies can also perform two types of 
                                                                                                                           
 90 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 82. 
 91 Id. To participate in NDIS, laboratories must meet several requirements, including being con-
sidered a “criminal justice agency,” being accredited in DNA testing, and complying with the federal 
record expungement requirements in § 12592(d). 34 U.S.C.A. § 12592 (West 2017); NDIS MANUAL, 
supra note 21, at 12–14. By meeting the requirements and participating in NDIS, a laboratory gains 
the benefits of a sublicense to use the CODIS software and the ability to upload DNA profiles to 
NDIS. Id. at 14–15. 
 92 Kreag, supra note 8, at 812–13. 
 93 Kreag, supra note 8, at 813; see Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Da-
tabases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 347 (2010) (characterizing state and local databases as “rogue” and 
“informal”). 
 94 Kreag, supra note 8, at 807 n.2, 808–09. 
 95 NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 27; see Kreag, supra note 8, at 815–16 (explaining that a 
search of NDIS can compare a crime-scene DNA profile against DNA profiles from known offenders 
and from other crime-scenes). 
 96 See NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 49, 50 (describing NDIS searches); Kreag, supra note 8, 
at 815–16 (describing NDIS searches). Comparing crime-scene DNA profiles to other crime-scene 
DNA profiles can identify serial offenders, even though the offenders’ identities are unknown. See 
NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 54 (explaining that two crime-scene DNA profiles might match 
each other, and that this is called a “Forensic Candidate Match”); Kreag, supra note 8, at 815 (stating 
that NDIS can identify serial offenders by comparing DNA profiles collected from crime scenes). The 
weekly searches have helped law enforcement agencies solve several unsolved crimes. Kreag, supra 
note 8, at 815; see, e.g., Colin Moynihan, Cold Case DNA Unit Links Rikers Inmate to ’86 Murder, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, at A19, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/07/nyregion/ny-cold-case-unit-
links-dna-to-86-murder.html [https://perma.cc/XA83-XWDJ]; see also Janon Fisher, Man Sentenced to 
Max—26 Years After Harlem Slaying, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 30, 2012), https://www.nydailynews.
com/new-york/man-sentenced-max-26-years-harlem-slaying-article-1.1125142 [https://perma.cc/
3XLQ-AR4H]. 
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searches to try to identify the perpetrators of unsolved cases.97 First, law en-
forcement agencies can perform a known-offender DNA profile search.98 In 
this search, the law enforcement agency has the DNA profile of a known per-
son of interest, and the agency performs a search to compare the individual’s 
profile against all of the crime-scene DNA profiles in the database.99 If the per-
son’s profile matches a crime-scene profile, law enforcement can link this per-
son to that unsolved crime.100 
Second, law enforcement agencies can perform a crime-scene DNA pro-
file search.101 In this search, the law enforcement agency has a profile that was 
collected from a crime scene, and the agency does not know the identity of the 
individual who is the source of that DNA.102 In this search, the law enforce-
ment agency compares the crime-scene profile to all known-offender and 
crime-scene profiles in the database.103 If the crime-scene DNA profile match-
es a known offender’s DNA profile, then law enforcement can link that indi-
vidual to the crime.104 If the crime-scene DNA profile matches another crime-
scene DNA profile, then law enforcement can link the two crimes and poten-
tially identify a serial offender.105 This type of search is also useful post-
conviction.106 If post-conviction DNA testing identifies a crime-scene DNA pro-
file, and the wrongfully convicted defendant is excluded as the source of that 
DNA, then a crime-scene profile search could identify the actual perpetrator.107 
To perform either of these two types of searches, a law enforcement agen-
cy can choose one of two methods—adding the DNA profile to the database or 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Kreag, supra note 8, at 815–16; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 52, 54 (explaining that 
NDIS can compare crime-scene DNA profiles against either known-offender profiles, which can pro-
duce an “Offender Candidate Match,” or against other crime-scene profiles, which can produce a 
“Forensic Candidate Match”). 
 98 Kreag, supra note 8, at 815; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 52. 
 99 Kreag, supra note 8, at 815–16; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 52. 
 100 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (explaining that comparing known-offender DNA profiles 
against crime-scene profiles can solve previously unsolved crimes); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 
52. 
 101 Kreag, supra note 8, at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 54. 
 102 Kreag, supra note 8, at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 54. 
 103 Kreag, supra note 8, at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 54. 
 104 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (stating that “law enforcement’s goal is to find potential perpe-
trators in unsolved cases”); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 54. 
 105 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 & n.52. If the search of a crime-scene DNA profile does not 
link the crime-scene DNA profile to a known-offender DNA profile, then familial searching, or par-
tial-match searching, can also be performed. Id. at 816 n.53. In a familial search, law enforcement 
tries to identify a known-offender profile that is similar enough to the crime-scene DNA profile that 
the unknown individual associated with the crime-scene profile must be a close relative of the person 
associated with the known profile. Id. See generally Murphy, supra note 93. 
 106 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 815, 816 (explaining that post-conviction litigants utilize both 
types of searches to establish innocence). 
 107 See id. (describing known-offender and crime-scene DNA profile searches). 
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conducting a keyboard search.108 A law enforcement agency can add a DNA 
profile to the database as part of its search only if the profile is sufficiently 
complete.109 Thus, some partial, crime-scene DNA profiles might not qualify 
for addition to the database.110 Once a profile is added to the database, it will 
be compared to others in the database during each weekly search.111 Thus, 
even if the initial search does not link the crime-scene DNA profile to a 
known-offender profile or another crime-scene profile, it could be linked to a 
new DNA profile added in the future.112 
In the second method, a keyboard search, a DNA database administrator 
manually enters a crime-scene DNA profile without adding it to the data-
base.113 The crime-scene profile is compared against known-offender profiles 
in the database just once.114 Because the crime-scene profile is not added to the 
database in a keyboard search, it will not be included in the weekly searches and 
compared against DNA profiles added to the database in the future.115 Keyboard 
searches are used to search only partial profiles, not complete profiles.116 Par-
tial profiles often result from degraded DNA, and are thus likely when working 
with old samples.117 
                                                                                                                           
 108 Id.; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 37, 50 (describing the submission of DNA profiles 
to NDIS and manual keyboard searches). 
 109 Kreag, supra note 8, at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 36–48 (explaining the crite-
ria that DNA profiles must meet to be added to NDIS). 
 110 See NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 36–38 (listing the criteria for DNA profiles to be sub-
mitted to NDIS); Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (explaining that a DNA profile can be permanently add-
ed to NDIS only if it is “sufficiently complete,” and that keyboard searches are used for partial DNA 
profiles). 
 111 NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50; Kreag, supra note 8, at 816. 
 112 See NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing the weekly searches of NDIS); Kreag, 
supra note 8, at 816 (describing the weekly searches of NDIS). 
 113 NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50; Kreag, supra note 8, at 816. 
 114 Kreag, supra note 8, at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing keyboard 
searches). 
 115 See NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing keyboard searches); Kreag, supra note 8, 
at 816 (describing keyboard searches). 
 116 Kreag, supra note 8, at 816; see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50–51 (describing keyboard 
searches). Partial profiles are often obtained from degraded samples or samples that only contained a 
small amount of DNA. Kreag, supra note 8, at 816. According to the FBI’s NDIS Manual, keyboard 
searches are allowed only in exceptional circumstances and must be approved by the FBI. NDIS 
MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50–51; Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 n.57. There are two exceptional cir-
cumstances in which keyboard searches are allowed. NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50–51. First, a 
keyboard search is allowed where urgent situations dictate that a DNA profile be searched before it is 
uploaded to NDIS. Id. at 50. For example, the possibility that a serial offender might commit another 
crime before the next scheduled search qualifies as an urgent situation. Id. at 51. Second, a keyboard 
search is allowed where a DNA profile from a serious violent crime does not meet the criteria to be 
uploaded to NDIS but does meet a specified lesser standard involving the statistical rarity of the par-
tial profile. Id. 
 117 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (stating that DNA degrades over time); Luongo, supra note 
30, at 130 (stating that samples from crime scenes are often degraded). 
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II. CURRENT STATE AND FEDERAL STATUTES PROVIDING ACCESS TO POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING AND DNA DATABASE SEARCHES 
All fifty states and Congress have enacted post-conviction DNA testing 
statutes.118 Only nine states, however, have enacted statutes granting post-
conviction litigants access to DNA database searches.119 In 2016, Congress 
also amended the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute to include a 
DNA database search provision.120 The federal statute, however, is available 
only to applicants incarcerated for federal convictions.121 
This Part analyzes post-conviction litigants’ access to DNA database 
searches under state and federal statutes.122 Section A describes the history of 
post-conviction DNA testing statutes as well as elements common to many of 
these statutes.123 Section B explains why some post-conviction litigants require 
access to DNA database searches to prove their innocence.124 Section B also 
analyzes state statutes that grant post-conviction litigants access to DNA data-
base searches.125 Section C analyzes the federal post-conviction DNA testing 
statute, which provides access to DNA database searches for applicants with 
federal convictions and a limited number of applicants with state convictions.126 
                                                                                                                           
 118 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e) (Supp. IV 2016); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808; Bronner, supra note 33. For 
a complete list of all fifty state post-conviction DNA testing statutes, see Post-Conviction Relief 
Through DNA Testing, 0030 SURVEYS 21 (West 2017). 
 119 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 34, at 779; Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 n.13; Bronner, supra 
note 33. The nine states are Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Texas. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-412(9) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(9) 
(2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
201(d)(2) (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(10) (2017); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-
a(c) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) 
(West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.035 (West 2017); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 
n.13; Bronner, supra note 33. 
 120 Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, Title IV, § 411(a)(1), 118 Stat. 2260 (2004). 
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (requiring that, any time DNA testing ordered under the 
statute excludes the post-conviction litigant as a source of the DNA, the federal district court must 
order law enforcement to upload the crime-scene DNA profile to NDIS to be searched against the 
DNA profiles in the database), with id. § 3600(e) (lacking a DNA database search provision and, in-
stead, only requiring that the results of DNA testing conducted according to the statute be reported to 
the court, applicant, and government, and that the government submit the post-conviction litigant’s 
DNA profile to NDIS). 
 121 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(1) (defining the class of post-conviction litigants eligible for relief under 
the statute—called “applicants”—as “individual[s] sentenced to imprisonment or death pursuant to a 
conviction for a Federal offense”). 
 122 See infra notes 127–204 and accompanying text. 
 123 See infra notes 127–137 and accompanying text. 
 124 See infra notes 138–181 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 138–181 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 182–204 and accompanying text. 
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A. An Introduction to Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes 
In 1996, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) released a report study-
ing the cases of the twenty-eight wrongfully convicted individuals who had 
been exonerated based on post-conviction DNA testing to date.127 Just a couple 
years later, in 1998 and 1999, respectively, Illinois and New York became the 
first two states to enact post-conviction DNA testing statutes.128 Also in 1999, 
the Post-Conviction Issues Working Group, part of the National Commission 
on the Future of DNA Evidence (“National DNA Commission”), published a 
report making recommendations regarding post-conviction DNA testing.129 
Shortly after the publication of this report, in 2000, eight more states enacted 
                                                                                                                           
 127 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY 
SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 2 
(1996) [hereinafter CONVICTED BY JURIES], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3ABK-7WPD]; Steinback, supra note 73, at 336. The study began in June 1995. CONVICT-
ED BY JURIES, supra, at 2. The study’s purpose was “to identify and review” DNA exoneration cases. 
Id. One of the twenty-eight cases studied was the case of Gary Dotson. Id. at ix–x; see supra note 73 
and accompanying text (describing the case of the first DNA exoneree, Gary Dotson, who was wrong-
fully convicted of rape). The study made several findings, including the following: most of the convic-
tions occurred in the mid- to late-1980s, before DNA testing became easily accessible; sexual assault 
was present in all twenty-eight cases; most of the cases involved some kind of forensic evidence; most 
of the post-conviction DNA testing was performed by private laboratories; and some laboratories used 
RFLP testing and others used PCR testing. CONVICTED BY JURIES, supra, at 12, 15, 19. 
 128 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3(a) (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-a 
(McKinney Supp. 1999); NAT’L COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 10 n.2 
(1999) [hereinafter DNA TESTING RECOMMENDATIONS], https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/177626.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3J5K-EDC7]; Steinback, supra note 73, at 336 & n.34. 
 129 DNA TESTING RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 128, at vi, vii; Steinback, supra note 73, at 
336. Attorney General Janet Reno asked the NIJ to create the National DNA Commission after she 
read about a DNA exoneration. DNA TESTING RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 128, at v. Attorney 
General Reno was concerned about possible wrongful convictions, and she tasked the National DNA 
Commission with making “recommendations . . . that [would] help ensure more effective use of DNA 
as a crimefighting tool and foster its use throughout the entire criminal justice system.” Id. The Na-
tional DNA Commission was comprised of members representing the forensic science and legal 
communities. See id. at vi. In its report, the Post-Conviction Issues Working Group made recommen-
dations for prosecutors, defense counsel, the judiciary, victim assistance, and laboratory personnel. Id. 
at ix, xv, xvi, xvii. Its recommendations included the following: (1) when prosecutors receive a re-
quest for post-conviction DNA testing, they should thoroughly research the case, including any previ-
ous DNA testing, and consult and notify other involved parties, including victim/witness specialists 
and forensic DNA experts; (2) when defense counsel receive a request for post-conviction DNA test-
ing, they should screen the case and search for evidence; (3) courts should schedule conferences to 
facilitate discussion of the type of DNA testing to be performed, and if the DNA testing results ex-
clude the defendant, the court should vacate the conviction; (4) victim assistance specialists should 
notify crime victims and their family members of the DNA testing; and (5) laboratories should serve 
as consultants to the other parties as needed, and laboratories should use only the amount of sample 
necessary for the test and retain untested samples. See id. at xv–xvii (making the recommendations 
listed here as well as additional recommendations). 
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post-conviction DNA testing statutes.130 In 2004, Congress enacted the federal 
post-conviction DNA testing statute.131 By 2013, all fifty states had enacted 
post-conviction DNA testing statutes.132 
Although the various state and federal post-conviction DNA testing stat-
utes are not identical, there are several elements that are common to many of 
these statutes.133 For example, some typical filing requirements are: the peti-
tioner must have been convicted of a major felony; the identity of the perpetra-
tor of the crime must have been an issue at trial; and the petitioner must be 
within the statute of limitations.134 Then, statutes commonly require that the 
evidence to be tested is material to the defense and that the evidence meet 
“chain of custody” standards demonstrating that it is reliable.135 Some statutes 
also specify whether a state or independent lab will perform the testing and 
who will pay for the testing.136 Additionally, some statutes explain the standard 
for relief after testing is completed and results are reported.137 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Steinback, supra note 73, at 336. The eight states are Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, 
Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Washington. Id. at 336 n.35; see 2000 Post Conviction Bills, DNA 
RESOURCE, http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/2000PostConvictionLegislation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/S62E-G43N]. 
 131 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006); Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 411(a)(1). 
 132 See Steinback, supra note 73, at 334, 336 (stating that, as of 2007, forty-two states had enacted 
post-conviction DNA testing statutes, leaving eight states—Alabama, Alaska, Massachusetts, Missis-
sippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Wyoming—that had not yet enacted post-
conviction DNA testing statutes). Wyoming enacted its post-conviction DNA testing statute in 2008. 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303 (2008). In 2009, Alabama, Mississippi, South Carolina, and South Da-
kota enacted their post-conviction DNA testing statutes. ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (2009); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 99-39-5 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-40 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2009). 
Alaska enacted its post-conviction DNA testing statute in 2010. ALASKA STAT. § 12.73.010 (2010). 
Massachusetts enacted its post-conviction DNA testing statute in 2012. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278A 
(2012). In 2013, Oklahoma was the last state to enact a post-conviction DNA testing statute. See 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1373 (2013). 
 133 See Steinback, supra note 73, at 336–38 (describing several provisions common to many post-
conviction DNA testing statutes). 
 134 Id. at 337; see Kathy Swedlow, Don’t Believe Everything You Read: A Review of Modern 
“Post-Conviction” DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 356–57 (2002) (listing filing re-
quirements common to several post-conviction DNA testing statutes). 
 135 Steinback, supra note 73, at 337; Swedlow, supra note 134, at 367–70 (describing the materi-
ality requirement included in several post-conviction DNA testing statutes); id. at 370–72 (describing 
the chain of custody requirement included in several post-conviction DNA testing statutes). 
 136 Steinback, supra note 73, at 337–38; Swedlow, supra note 134, at 381–82 (describing post-
conviction DNA testing statutes’ provisions regarding payment for the costs of DNA testing). 
 137 Steinback, supra note 73, at 337–38; Swedlow, supra note 134, at 382–84 (discussing the 
standards for relief under several post-conviction DNA testing statutes). The Innocence Project makes 
several recommendations for improving state post-conviction DNA testing statutes. See generally 
Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/
access-post-conviction-dna-testing [https://perma.cc/SZV4-84CZ] (recommending several improve-
ments to post-conviction DNA testing statutes). The Innocence Project’s recommendations address: 
(1) who may file, (2) standards to be used by the courts in determining when to order a 
post-conviction DNA test, (3) the ‘chain of custody’ requirement to ensure the reliabil-
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B. Post-Conviction Access to DNA Database Searches Under State Statutes 
Once a post-conviction litigant clears all of the hurdles in a state statute, 
he or she can obtain post-conviction DNA testing, which may exclude the liti-
gant as the source of the DNA recovered from the crime scene.138 In some cas-
es, however, exculpatory post-conviction DNA testing results alone have not 
been enough to establish innocence in the eyes of a court.139 Some wrongfully 
convicted defendants have needed the additional step of a DNA database 
search to identify the actual perpetrators of the crimes for which they were 
wrongfully convicted in order to prove their innocence.140 
                                                                                                                           
ity of the DNA evidence that is being sought, (4) appointment of counsel, (5) preserva-
tion of evidence requirements, (6) laboratory choice and payment responsibilities, (7) 
appellate procedures and instructions on the adjudication of successive DNA testing pe-
titions, and (8) the means with which to provide relief if the DNA testing returns in the 
petitioner’s favor. 
Steinback, supra note 73, at 338. Some of the Innocence Project’s recommendations include the fol-
lowing: allow access to post-conviction DNA testing even in cases where the post-conviction litigant 
pled guilty or confessed to the crime; allow litigants access to search national and state DNA data-
bases; require preservation of biological evidence; allow appeals of denials of post-conviction DNA 
testing; and provide funding for post-conviction DNA testing. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Test-
ing, supra. 
 138 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 806 (explaining that post-conviction DNA testing excluded both 
Michael Morton and Rickey Dale Wyatt as the source of crime-scene DNA in each of their cases); 
Steinback, supra note 73, at 336–38 (describing the requirements to obtain post-conviction DNA 
testing under state statutes); see, e.g., supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text (describing the case of 
Michael Morton, who was wrongfully convicted of murdering his wife and obtained exculpatory post-
conviction DNA testing but was not exonerated until a DNA database search identified the actual 
perpetrator); supra note 26 (describing the case of Rickey Dale Wyatt, who was wrongfully convicted 
of aggravated rape and obtained exculpatory DNA testing results but was not allowed access to search 
any DNA databases). 
 139 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 806–08 (describing the story of Michael Morton, who obtained 
post-conviction DNA testing that excluded him as the source of DNA connected to his wife’s murder, 
but who was unable to prove his innocence until he obtained a DNA database search that identified 
the actual perpetrator of the crime). 
 140 See id. (describing Michael Morton’s case). The case of Jeffrey Deskovic provides another 
example. Id. at 825. On November 15, 1989, a 15-year-old girl was raped and murdered in Peekskill, 
New York while out working on a photography assignment for school. Profile of Jeffrey Deskovic, 
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/case
detail.aspx?caseid=3171 [https://perma.cc/8YNJ-L7W7]. Police suspected 16-year-old Deskovic, the 
victim’s classmate, because he was tardy to school the day after the victim disappeared and was very 
upset after learning of her death. Id. Months after the murder, police interrogated Deskovic for six 
hours and administered three polygraph examinations, after which Deskovic falsely confessed to the 
crime. Id. Before trial, DNA testing excluded Deskovic as a source of the semen found on the vaginal 
swabs from the victim’s rape kit. Id. Despite this evidence, the prosecution continued their case 
against Deskovic. Id. At trial, the prosecution argued that the victim had consensual sex and that that 
partner was the source of the semen in the victim’s rape kit. Id. The prosecution argued that Deskovic 
was jealous of the victim’s partner and murdered the victim out of jealousy. Id. A jury in Westchester 
County, New York convicted Deskovic of first-degree rape and second-degree murder in January 
1991. Id. In 2006, Deskovic obtained post-conviction DNA testing and a search of the New York 
State DNA databank of convicted felons. Id. The search identified Steven Cunningham as the source 
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DNA database searches can help prove wrongfully convicted individuals’ 
innocence.141 In cases where the post-conviction litigant has already obtained 
DNA testing that excludes the litigant as the source of the DNA from the 
crime, a DNA database search could identify the actual perpetrator, which 
would conclusively establish the litigant’s innocence and lead to exonera-
tion.142 Even if the DNA database did not contain a known-offender DNA pro-
file from the actual perpetrator, that perpetrator’s profile could still be in the 
DNA database in the form of a DNA profile from an unsolved crime, and this 
search would indicate that a serial offender is likely the actual perpetrator of 
the crime.143 
Despite the power of DNA database searches, the fact that all fifty states 
have enacted post-conviction DNA testing statutes, and the fact that all fifty 
states participate in NDIS, only nine states have enacted statutes allowing post-
conviction litigants access to search DNA databases.144 Without a statute grant-
                                                                                                                           
of the semen in the victim’s rape kit. Id. Cunningham had previously been convicted of murdering his 
girlfriend’s sister. Id. On September 20, 2006, Deskovic’s conviction was overturned, and he was 
exonerated on November 2, 2006. Id. 
 141 Kreag, supra note 8, at 817, 818. 
 142 Id. at 817; see Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1659 (2008) 
(explaining that, in some cases, despite exculpatory DNA testing results, the prosecution did not admit 
that the defendant was innocent until a DNA database search identified the actual perpetrator); see, 
e.g., supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text (describing the case of Michael Morton, who obtained 
exculpatory post-conviction DNA testing but was not exonerated until a DNA database search identi-
fied his wife’s actual killer); supra note 140 (describing the case of Jeffrey Deskovic); see also Banks 
v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that “a negative [DNA test] 
result would not necessarily exculpate the defendant”). Additional examples of cases where wrongful-
ly convicted individuals needed DNA database searches to identify the actual perpetrators in order to 
prove their own innocence include the cases of Steven Avery, Darryl Hunt, Douglas Warney, and 
Jerry Watkins. See Garrett, supra, at 1659 n.133, 1713 n.403; Know the Cases: Darryl Hunt, INNO-
CENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/darryl-hunt [https://perma.cc/Z2UC-NAN5] 
(recounting the case of Darryl Hunt, who was wrongfully convicted of murder and was exonerated 
after a search of a North Carolina state DNA database identified the actual perpetrator); Know the 
Cases: Douglas Warney, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/douglas-
warney [https://perma.cc/7JQK-76LW] (explaining the case of Douglas Warney, who was wrongfully 
convicted of murder and was exonerated after a search of NDIS identified the actual perpetrator); 
Know the Cases: Jerry Watkins, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/jerry-
watkins [https://perma.cc/6VU2-Y5SS] (recounting the case of Jerry Watkins, who was wrongfully 
convicted of murder and exonerated after a search of the Indiana State Police DNA database identified 
the actual perpetrator); Know the Cases: Steven Avery, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocence
project.org/cases/steven-avery [https://perma.cc/2Y7B-EKHH] (describing the case of Steven Avery, 
who was wrongfully convicted of rape and was exonerated after a search of the FBI’s DNA database 
identified the actual perpetrator). 
 143 Kreag, supra note 8, at 817 & n.59. 
 144 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 34, at 779 (2015); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 & n.13; Bronner, 
supra note 33; Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 82. The nine states are 
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas. CO-
LO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-412(9) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(9) (2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/116-5 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(2) (West 2017); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 99-39-11(10) (2017); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-a(c) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. 
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ing access, law enforcement agencies and prosecutor’s offices have discretion 
to decide whether to allow post-conviction litigants to search DNA data-
bases.145 For many defendants, it is challenging to obtain prosecutors’ agree-
ment to DNA database searches because the cases are complex and convictions 
have an “anchoring effect,” causing prosecutors to believe that there is so 
much evidence of the defendant’s guilt that DNA testing is pointless.146 Even if 
a prosecutor’s office agrees to a DNA database search, a post-conviction liti-
gant may still face opposition from the law enforcement agency that maintains 
the databases and performs the search.147 For example, in one case, the FBI 
opposed a post-conviction litigant’s request for a DNA database search even 
though the prosecutor and local law enforcement agreed to the search.148 In 
contrast, a fairer approach to providing post-conviction litigants with access to 
DNA database searches may be for states to enact statutes that instruct trial 
                                                                                                                           
STAT. § 15A-269 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 64.035 (West 2017); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 n.13; Bronner, supra note 33. 
 145 Kreag, supra note 8, at 818. If a post-conviction litigant can, however, convince the prosecutor 
to agree to the DNA database search and file a joint request with the court, then the post-conviction 
litigant will be more likely to succeed. Id. at 818–20. 
 146 Kreag, supra note 8, at 820–22. Two barriers to post-conviction DNA database searches are 
the “anchoring effect of a conviction,” and law enforcement opposition. Id. The “anchoring effect” 
refers to the concept that prosecutors believe that there is “overwhelming evidence” of the post-
conviction litigant’s guilt, so there is no need for DNA testing. Id. at 821. 
 147 Id. at 820. 
 148 Id. at 822. In Juan Rivera’s case, the prosecutor and local law enforcement joined the defend-
ant in seeking a DNA database search, and the trial court ordered the FBI to conduct the search, yet 
the FBI still opposed the request and refused to perform the search. Id. at 822–25. In 1992, Rivera was 
convicted of raping and murdering an eleven-year-old girl near Chicago, Illinois. Id. at 822–23. In 
2005, post-conviction DNA testing excluded Rivera as the source of the male DNA in the victim’s 
rape kit. Id. at 823. The prosecutor and local law enforcement agreed to a DNA database search. Id. 
Law enforcement performed manual keyboard searches of the Illinois state DNA databases, but there 
were no matches. Id. Rivera requested a search of the national DNA database, and the prosecutor 
agreed again. Id. In June 2008, the state trial court ordered the FBI to conduct a manual keyboard 
search of the national DNA database, but the FBI refused to perform the search. Id. On February 2, 
2009, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ordered the FBI to conduct 
the DNA database search. Rivera v. Mueller, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Kreag, 
supra note 8, at 824. The FBI performed the manual keyboard search, but there were no hits. Kreag, 
supra note 8, at 824. In 2014, however, the partial crime-scene DNA profile was linked to a murder 
that happened near Chicago in 2000, while Rivera was incarcerated. Id; Steve Mills & Dan Hinkel, 
DNA Links Murder and Rape of Holly Taker, 11, to Second Murder 8 Years Later, CHI. TRIB. (June 
10, 2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2014-06-10-chi-dna-links-murder-and-rape-
of-holly-staker-11-to-second-murder-8-years-later-20140610-story.html [https://perma.cc/3XPL-
SGQE?type=image]. See generally Rivera, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1163; Andrew Martin, The Prosecution’s 
Case Against DNA, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 25, 2011, at M44, https://www.nytimes. com/2011/ 
11/27/magazine/dna-evidence-lake-county.html [https://perma.cc/7N8M-6K4U]; Rob Warden, Juan 
Rivera, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC: CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.north
western.edu/legalclinic/wrongfulconvictions/exonerations/il/juan-rivera.html [https://perma.cc/2G49-
K7FW]. 
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courts to evaluate these complex cases and grant DNA database searches 
where the appropriate statutory criteria are met.149 
1. Illinois 
In 1998, Illinois became the first state to enact a post-conviction DNA 
testing statute.150 Five years later, in 2003, the Illinois legislature enacted an-
other statute, which created a motion for DNA database search, available to 
both pre-trial defendants and post-conviction litigants.151 Compared to other 
states’ statutes, the Illinois statute has one of the lowest standards for obtaining 
a DNA database search—the statute’s only requirement is that DNA evidence 
may be material or relevant to the defendant’s case.152 The statute, however, 
balances this low standard with a trade-off—even if the materiality-relevance 
requirement is met, the court still has discretion to decide whether to order the 
DNA database search or not.153 
Although the statute gives the court discretion, rather than making the DNA 
database search mandatory, the statute provides for a thorough search where the 
                                                                                                                           
 149 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 819–20 (proposing a formal process for trial courts to follow when 
post-conviction litigants seek access to DNA database searches). 
 150 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3(a); DNA TESTING RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 128, 
at 10 n.2; Steinback, supra note 73, at 336 & n.34. 
 151 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5. The Illinois DNA database search statute is separate 
from the Illinois post-conviction DNA testing statute. Compare id. § 5/116-3(a) (providing post-
conviction litigants with access to DNA testing), with id. § 5/116-5 (providing post-conviction liti-
gants with access to DNA database searches). The DNA database search statute requires that the post-
conviction litigant has already obtained DNA testing before submitting a motion requesting the DNA 
database search. See id. § 5/116-5(a); Kreag, supra note 8, at 817. The Illinois DNA database search 
statute provides searches to pre-trial defendants as well, but defendants’ access to DNA database 
searches pre-trial is less significant than post-conviction access because law enforcement agencies 
routinely perform searches pre-trial, even if defendants do not request the searches. 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a); Kreag, supra note 8, at 809 n.14. 
 152 Compare 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a) (requiring only that DNA evidence may be 
material or relevant to the defendant’s case), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (listing five 
requirements that a post-conviction litigant must meet in order to obtain post-conviction DNA testing 
and a DNA database search). 
 153 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a). Like Illinois, Mississippi and New York also allow 
trial courts discretion to decide whether to order a DNA database search, rather than making the 
search mandatory. See id.; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(10); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-a(c). 
In contrast, the Maryland, North Carolina, and Texas statutes make DNA database searches mandato-
ry if the appropriate requirements are met. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(2); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.035. The North Carolina statute 
has the opposite trade-off compared to the Illinois statute—the North Carolina statute has greater 
requirements, but it makes a DNA database search mandatory rather than permissive. Compare 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a) (requiring only that DNA evidence may be material or relevant to 
the defendant’s case but allowing courts discretion to decide whether to grant DNA database search-
es), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (making DNA database searches mandatory but requiring 
that five criteria are met for a post-conviction litigant to obtain DNA testing and a DNA database 
search). 
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court chooses to order it.154 Under the statute, the search may include comparing 
a crime-scene DNA profile against both known-offender profiles and DNA pro-
files from unsolved crimes maintained in state or local law enforcement data-
bases.155 Additionally, the court may order the Illinois Department of State Po-
lice to request a search of NDIS if the appropriate federal criteria are met.156 
Thus, the statute potentially provides access to all possible DNA databases and 
searches, except that the statute fails to explain whether a court can order a key-
board search for a partial crime-scene DNA profile.157 If the defense requests, 
the Illinois Department of State Police must also provide the defense with copies 
of all documentation, including notes and reports, related to the DNA database 
search and analysis.158 Therefore, the statute ensures that the defense has access 
to the same documentation as law enforcement and prosecutors.159 
2. North Carolina 
The North Carolina legislature enacted the state’s post-conviction DNA 
testing statute—section 15A-269 of the North Carolina Code—in 2001, but the 
statute did not provide for DNA database searches until the legislature amend-
ed it for the fourth time in 2009.160 Unlike the Illinois statute, the North Caro-
lina statute is specific to post-conviction litigants and is not available to pre-
trial defendants.161 The North Carolina statute has more stringent requirements 
than the Illinois statute, but, if the applicant meets all five requirements, the 
trial court must grant both DNA testing and a CODIS search.162 The five re-
                                                                                                                           
 154 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a)(1)–(2), (a)(3)(ii), (b), (c). 
 155 Id. § 5/116-5(a)(1)–(2), (a)(3)(ii). 
 156 Id. § 5/116-5(b). The criteria for a search of NDIS include that the DNA testing was per-
formed using an approved kit and that the DNA profile is sufficiently complete. NDIS MANUAL, su-
pra note 21, at 39. In contrast to Illinois, the Colorado DNA database search provision takes a differ-
ent approach and allows only for a search of state DNA databases, not a search of NDIS. See COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 18-1-412(9) (referring specifically to the “state index system”); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/116-5(b) (allowing for a search of NDIS if the “appropriate federal criteria are met”). 
 157 See ch. 725, 5/116-5(b) (not enumerating whether the statute provides for keyboard searches); 
NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing keyboard searches); Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 
(describing keyboard searches). 
 158 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(c). 
 159 See id. (providing the defense access to the same documentation as the prosecution). 
 160 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2009) (providing for DNA database searches), with 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2001) (not providing for DNA database searches). The North Carolina 
legislature enacted the statute in 2001, and since then, the legislature has amended the statute four 
times. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2017). 
 161 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a) (2017). Unlike the Illinois statute, the North Carolina statute 
refers only to post-conviction litigants and not to pre-trial defendants. Compare id. § 15A-269 (titled 
“Request for post-conviction DNA testing”), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a) (allowing 
any defendant “charged with any offense where DNA evidence may be material to the defense inves-
tigation or relevant at trial” to apply for a DNA database search). 
 162 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (making DNA database searches mandatory but 
requiring that five criteria be met for a post-conviction litigant to obtain DNA testing and a DNA 
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quirements are (1) that the evidence be material to the defense; (2) that the ev-
idence be related to the conviction; (3) that the evidence either (a) have not 
previously been DNA tested, or (b) have been previously tested, but the new 
results would be “significantly more accurate and probative of the identity of 
the perpetrator or accomplice or have a reasonable probability of contradicting 
prior test results”; (4) that it be reasonably probable that the DNA testing 
would have resulted in a verdict better for the defendant; and (5) that the de-
fendant signed an affidavit asserting his innocence.163 
Although the North Carolina statute makes a CODIS search mandatory 
where the five requirements are met, the statute lacks the detailed description 
of the DNA database search that the Illinois statute includes.164 The North Car-
olina statute does not specify which law enforcement agency will perform the 
DNA database search or which specific databases in CODIS that will be 
                                                                                                                           
database search), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a) (requiring only that DNA evidence may 
be material or relevant to the defendant’s case, but allowing courts discretion to decide whether to 
grant DNA database searches). Other state statutes that, like the North Carolina statute, make a DNA 
database search mandatory include Maryland and Texas. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
201(d)(2) (“A court shall order a data base search . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(b) (“The court 
shall grant the motion for DNA testing and, if testing complies with FBI requirements, the run of any 
profiles obtained from the testing . . . .”); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.035 (“[T]he convict-
ing court shall order any unidentified DNA profile to be compared with the DNA profiles in [NDIS 
and the Texas state DNA database].”). Because the North Carolina statute provides for both post-
conviction DNA testing and a DNA database search, a post-conviction litigant can request both DNA 
testing and a DNA database search simultaneously, rather than having to obtain DNA testing results 
before requesting a DNA database search. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b); Kreag, supra note 
8, at 818 (explaining that some post-conviction litigants seek post-conviction DNA testing and a DNA 
database search simultaneously). 
 163 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)(1)–(3), (b)(1)–(3). The North Carolina statute’s requirements 
are significant in comparison to the Illinois statute’s minimal requirements. Compare id. § 15A-
269(a)–(b) (making DNA database searches mandatory but requiring that five criteria be met for a 
post-conviction litigant to obtain DNA testing and a DNA database search), with 725 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a) (requiring only that DNA evidence may be material or relevant to the defend-
ant’s case but allowing courts discretion to decide whether to grant DNA database searches). The 
Maryland and New York DNA database statutes have similar requirements to the North Carolina 
statute. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(2) (“A court shall order a data base search 
by a law enforcement agency if the court finds that a reasonable probability exists that the database 
search will produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or 
sentencing.”), and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-a(c) (stating that a trial court may order a 
CODIS search if there is a reasonable probability that, had the search been conducted and admitted at 
trial, the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
269(a)–(b) (requiring that five criteria are met for a post-conviction litigant to obtain DNA testing and 
a DNA database search). 
 164 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (not providing detailed instructions for the law en-
forcement agency performing the DNA database search). Compare id. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (not provid-
ing detailed instructions for the law enforcement agency performing the DNA database search), with 
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a) (detailing the process that the Illinois Department of State 
Police should follow when it performs a DNA database search). 
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searched.165 Additionally, the North Carolina statute does not state whether the 
crime-scene DNA profile will be compared against only the DNA profiles of 
known individuals or whether it will be compared against other crime-scene 
DNA profiles from unsolved crimes as well.166 Like the Illinois statute, the 
North Carolina statute fails to explain whether a post-conviction litigant can 
obtain a keyboard search under the statute.167 The North Carolina statute also 
lacks language requiring that documentation related to the DNA database 
search be provided to the defense.168 
3. Ohio 
Ohio enacted its post-conviction DNA testing statute in 2003.169 The 
DNA database search provision was not added to the statute until an amend-
                                                                                                                           
 165 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (not specifying a law enforcement agency that con-
ducts the DNA database search, and only stating that “if testing complies with FBI requirements and 
the data meets NDIS criteria, profiles obtained from the testing shall be searched and/or uploaded to 
CODIS if the biological evidence meets all of the . . . conditions [in this statute]”). Most precisely, the 
term “CODIS” refers to the FBI’s software for running DNA databases, but the term “CODIS” is also 
used to refer generally to DNA databases that participate in the FBI’s program. See Frequently Asked 
Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 82 (defining CODIS as “the generic term used to describe 
the FBI’s program of support for criminal justice DNA databases as well as the software used to run 
these databases”). Based on this common usage of “CODIS” as a generic term to refer to all DNA 
databases, it is possible that the legislature intended for the statute to include searches of state and 
local DNA databases as well as NDIS. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269; Frequently Asked Questions 
on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 82. Like the North Carolina statute, the Mississippi and New York 
statutes also refer specifically to searching CODIS. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a), with 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(10), and N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-a(c). 
 166 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (not specifying which types of DNA profiles the 
crime-scene DNA profile will be compared against); Kreag, supra note 8, at 815–16 (stating that 
NDIS is able to compare a crime-scene DNA profile against profiles of known offenders and other 
crime-scene DNA profiles in NDIS). 
 167 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (not stating whether keyboard searches are al-
lowed under the statute), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a)–(d) (not stating whether key-
board searches are allowed under the statute). 
 168 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (not stating whether documentation related to the 
DNA database search will be provided to the defense), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(c) 
(stating that, at the defense’s request, “[t]he defense shall be provided with copies of all documenta-
tion, correspondence, including digital correspondence, notes, memoranda, and reports generated in 
relation to the analysis”). 
 169 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.72–.73 (2003). In 2016, in State v. Noling, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio held section 2953.73(E)(1) unconstitutional for violating the right to equal protection under 
both the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, and the court severed this provision 
from the rest of the statute. 75 N.E.3d 141, 156–57 (Ohio 2016). The court concluded that the statute 
violated the right to equal protection because it established different procedures for capital and non-
capital offenders to appeal denials of applications for post-conviction DNA testing, and there was no 
legitimate purpose for doing so. Id. at 144–45, 149–50. 
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ment in 2006.170 In Ohio, a post-conviction litigant must first apply for post-
conviction DNA testing under section 2953.73, and, if the court grants the test-
ing, the court may then order the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and 
Investigation to perform a CODIS search under section 2953.74(E).171 The 
Ohio statute shares a few of the North Carolina statute’s potential shortcom-
ings.172 First, like the North Carolina statute, the Ohio statute does not specify 
which specific databases included in CODIS will be searched.173 Second, the 
Ohio statute does not state whether the crime-scene DNA profile will be com-
pared against only the DNA profiles of known individuals or whether it will 
also be compared against other crime-scene DNA profiles from unsolved 
crimes.174 Third, like both the Illinois and North Carolina statutes, the Ohio 
statute does not explain whether keyboard searches are permitted.175 
Otherwise, compared to the Illinois and North Carolina statutes, Ohio’s 
statute provides some of the most detailed step-by-step instructions for the law 
enforcement agency conducting the DNA database searches.176 According to 
the statute, if the CODIS search identifies the contributor to the DNA profile, 
then the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation must pro-
vide this information to the court, the post-conviction litigant, and the prose-
cuting attorney.177 Alternatively, if the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification 
and Investigation does not identify the contributor from the CODIS search, the 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (West 2006) (providing for DNA database 
searches), with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (West 2003) (not providing for DNA database 
searches). 
 171 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (West 2017). The Ohio and Illinois statutes both give 
discretion to the trial court to decide whether to order a DNA database search. Compare id. (“[T]he 
eligible offender may request the court to order, or the court on its own initiative may order [a DNA 
database search].”), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a) (“[A] court may order a DNA data-
base search . . . .”). Other state statutes giving trial courts discretion to decide whether to grant a DNA 
database search include Mississippi and New York. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(10) (“The court 
may order . . . .”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-a(c) (“[T]he court may order . . . .”). 
 172 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b). 
 173 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (referring only to CODIS and not to specific 
national, state, or local databases), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a) (also referring only to 
CODIS). The statutes’ references to “CODIS,” however, could be intended to include all state and 
local databases as well as NDIS. See supra note 82 (explaining that the term “CODIS” is sometimes 
used to refer to all the national, state, and local databases that use the CODIS software). 
 174 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E); Kreag, supra note 8, at 815–16 (stating that NDIS is 
able to compare a crime-scene DNA profile against profiles of known offenders and other crime-scene 
DNA profiles in NDIS). Compare § 2953.74(E), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b). 
 175 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing 
keyboard searches); Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (describing keyboard searches). Compare 
§ 2953.74(E), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b). 
 176 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (specifying the steps that the law enforcement agen-
cy performing the DNA database search should take depending on whether the DNA database search 
identifies the actual perpetrator of the crime or not). Compare id., with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
5/116-5, and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b). 
 177 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E). 
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statute instructs that the bureau may compare the crime-scene DNA profile 
against other DNA testing results where the contributor’s identity is known.178 
Because the statute requires that the DNA profile must be from a known person, 
the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation may not compare 
the test results against DNA profiles from unsolved crimes.179 If the comparison 
between the crime-scene DNA profile and known-offenders identifies the con-
tributor to the crime-scene profile, the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification 
and Investigation must provide this information to the court, the post-conviction 
litigant, and the prosecuting attorney.180 Unlike the Illinois statute, however, the 
Ohio statute does not require the law enforcement agency to provide all docu-
mentation related to the DNA database search to the post-conviction litigant.181 
C. The Federal Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute: 18 U.S.C. § 3600 
Congress enacted the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute—18 
U.S.C. § 3600—in 2004.182 Since then, Congress has amended the statute only 
once, in 2016.183 The 2016 amendment added two new provisions to the stat-
ute.184 First, the amendment added a requirement that the federal government, 
                                                                                                                           
 178 Id. The statute states that the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation “may 
compare the test results to other previously obtained and acceptable DNA test results of any person 
whose identity is known.” Id. The statute, however, does not explain who—a law enforcement agen-
cy, the prosecution, or the defense team—can provide a known-offender DNA profile for comparison 
or why this known-offender profile would not be in one of the law enforcement DNA databases that 
was already searched. See id. 
 179 See id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Compare id. (not specifying that the law enforcement agency performing the DNA database 
search must provide documentation to the defense), with 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(c) (stat-
ing that, at the defense’s request, “[t]he defense shall be provided with copies of all documentation, 
correspondence, including digital correspondence, notes, memoranda, and reports generated in rela-
tion to the analysis”). 
 182 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2012). The federal post-conviction DNA testing statute—§ 3600—is also 
called the Innocence Protection Act of 2004 (“IPA”). Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 401; Da-
vid A. Schumacher, Comment, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing: The Federal Government 
Does Not Offer an Adequate Solution, Leaving the States to Remedy the Situation, 57 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 1245, 1248 (2008). The IPA was enacted as part of the Justice for All Act of 2004 (“JFAA”). 
Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 411; Schumacher, supra, at 1248. The JFAA had several pur-
poses, including “to provide post-conviction testing of DNA evidence to exonerate the innocent.” 
Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 411. According to Senator Patrick Leahy, the IPA’s purpose 
was “to ‘reduce the risk that innocent persons may be executed’ and ‘[e]nsure that convicted offenders 
are afforded an opportunity to prove their innocence through DNA testing.’” Schumacher, supra, at 
1248. 
 183 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006), with 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 2016). This amendment 
was part of the Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 (“JFARA”). Justice for All Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 11(a), 130 Stat. 1956 (2016). One of the JFARA’s purposes 
is “to provide post-conviction testing of DNA evidence to exonerate the innocent.” Id. 
 184 Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 § 11(a). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 
2016), with 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006). 
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upon the post-conviction litigant’s filing of a motion for post-conviction DNA 
testing, create an inventory of all evidence in the case and share the inventory 
with the court and the post-conviction litigant.185 Second, the amendment add-
ed a provision providing that, where the DNA testing excludes the applicant as 
a contributor to a crime-scene DNA profile, a law enforcement agency will 
submit the DNA profile to NDIS for comparison against both DNA profiles of 
known individuals and DNA profiles from unsolved crimes.186 
1. Eligibility of State Offenses 
Only individuals incarcerated for federal convictions are eligible to apply 
for post-conviction DNA testing under § 3600.187 An applicant can apply for 
DNA testing related to the federal offense that he or she is incarcerated for or 
for DNA testing related to another federal offense that was a factor at the ap-
plicant’s sentencing.188 The statute also allows applicants to move for post-
conviction DNA testing in connection with some state convictions.189 Only a 
limited number of state convictions qualify for federal relief, however, because 
the statute requires that the applicant is currently imprisoned for a federal of-
fense, that evidence of the state offense was admitted at a federal sentencing 
                                                                                                                           
 185 18 U.S.C. § 3600(b)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (Supp. IV 2016); see Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 
2016 § 11(a). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 2016), with 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006). 
 186 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 2016); see Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 
§ 11(a). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 2016), with 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006). 
 187 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (Supp. IV 2016). Any “individual sentenced to imprisonment or death 
pursuant to a conviction for a Federal offense” qualifies as an “applicant” and may apply for relief 
under § 3600. Id. § 3600(a)(1). Under § 3600, a court must grant post-conviction DNA testing if the 
applicant meets all the following requirements: (1) the applicant claims that he or she is actually inno-
cent of either (a) the federal offense that he or she is currently imprisoned for, or (b) another federal or 
state offense that he or she was convicted of, where (i) evidence of that federal or state offense was 
admitted during a federal sentencing hearing to support a sentence from which the applicant could get 
relief if exonerated for the state offense, and (ii) for a state offense, there is no adequate DNA testing 
remedy under state law, and the applicant has exhausted all state DNA testing remedies; (2) the evi-
dence for which the applicant requests DNA testing was obtained in connection with the investigation 
or prosecution of the federal or state offense of which the defendant claims to be innocent; (3) either 
(a) the evidence has not been DNA tested or (b) a new DNA testing method is “substantially more 
probative than the prior DNA testing”; (4) the government has the evidence in its possession, and the 
evidence meets chain of custody standards; (5) “[t]he proposed DNA testing is reasonable in scope, 
uses scientifically sound methods, and is consistent with accepted forensic practices”; (6) the appli-
cant’s theory of defense is consistent with affirmative defenses presented at trial and would establish 
actual innocence; (7) the perpetrator’s identity was at issue at trial; (8) the proposed DNA testing 
“may produce new material evidence” supporting the defense’s theory and “rais[ing] a reasonable 
probability that the applicant did not commit the offense”; (9) the applicant will provide a DNA sam-
ple; and (10) the motion is timely. See § 3600(a)(1)–(10) (listing these requirements in more detail). 
The 2016 amendment did not alter the elements required for a post-conviction litigant to obtain DNA 
testing. See Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 § 11(a). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 
2016), with 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006). 
 188 18 U.S.C. 3600(a)(1)(A)–(B) (Supp. IV 2016). 
 189 Id. § 3600(a)(1)(B). 
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hearing to support a sentence from which the applicant could get relief if exon-
erated for the state offense, and that the applicant has exhausted state reme-
dies.190 
This eligibility requirement significantly restricts the number of wrong-
fully convicted individuals who can apply for post-conviction DNA testing 
under the federal statute.191 Considering applicants convicted of federal offens-
es, there are relatively few known wrongful convictions for federal offenses; 
rather, the majority of wrongful convictions that are discovered involve state 
offenses.192 Of the 2,360 exonerations since 1989 included in the National 
Registry of Exonerations, only 111 (4.7%) are for federal offenses.193 Moreo-
ver, of those 111 exonerations for federal offenses, DNA was present in only 
one case, and there were only nine cases—four murder cases and five sexual 
assault cases—of the type where DNA evidence is commonly found.194 When 
federal wrongful convictions are discovered, they are largely for crimes like 
fraud, conspiracy, and drug offenses, where there typically is no DNA evi-
dence.195 Furthermore, in the one federal wrongful conviction case where DNA 
                                                                                                                           
 190 Id. § 3600(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii); Harris v. Wolfenbarger, No. 2:05-CV-74316, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEX-
IS 114781, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2012) (holding that only federal prisoners, not state prison-
ers, are eligible to file for post-conviction DNA testing under § 3600); Sartain v. State, 401 P.3d 701, 
704 (Mont. 2017) (denying the plaintiff’s request for DNA testing under § 3600 because he was not 
imprisoned for a federal offense). If an applicant asserts innocence not of the federal offense that he or 
she is currently serving a prison sentence for, but rather, of another federal or state offense, then the 
statute requires that “evidence of such offense was admitted during a Federal sentencing hearing and 
exoneration of such offense would entitle the applicant to a reduced sentence or new sentencing hear-
ing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a)(1)(B)(i). Additionally, if the applicant asserts innocence of a state offense, 
the statute also requires that “the applicant demonstrates that there is no adequate remedy under State 
law to permit DNA testing of the specified evidence relating to the State offense” and “to the extent 
available, the applicant has exhausted all remedies available under State law for requesting DNA 
testing of specified evidence relating to the State offense.” Id. § 3600(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)–(II). 
 191 See § 3600(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii); Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27 (select “Federal” 
next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases) (showing that, as of December 20, 2018, out of 
2,360 exonerations since 1989, only 111 (4.7%) are for federal crimes). 
 192 See Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27 (select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” 
to filter for federal cases) (providing the number of exonerations for federal and state crimes). 
 193 Id. (select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases). 
 194 Id. (select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases; then select “Present” 
next to “DNA” to filter for cases involving DNA, or select “Murder” under “Crime” to filter for mur-
der cases, or select “Sexual Assault” under “Crime” to filter for sexual assault cases); see infra note 
196 (detailing the case of Eric Smith, the only federal exoneree whose case involved DNA). 
 195 See Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27 (select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” 
to filter for federal cases; then select “Present” next to “DNA” to filter for cases involving DNA); id. 
(select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases; then select “Drugs” under “Crime” 
to filter for cases involving drug offenses, or select “Other” under “Crime” to filter for cases involving 
other crimes, such as fraud and conspiracy). Most DNA exonerations are rape and rape-murder cases 
because these are the types of cases where it is common for the perpetrator to leave biological evi-
dence at the crime scene, whereas biological evidence is less common in other types of cases, such as 
robbery cases, for instance. See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 5 (explaining that, out of the first 250 
DNA exonerations, the most common crimes were rape, rape-murder, and murder, whereas other 
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was present, DNA was not the basis for the exoneration.196 This analysis sug-
gests that there are few individuals wrongfully convicted of federal crimes 
successfully applying for and being exonerated based on post-conviction DNA 
testing under § 3600.197 
Regarding state offenses, although § 3600 provides an avenue for post-
conviction DNA testing for some applicants with state offenses, the require-
ments that the applicant be imprisoned for a federal offense and that evidence 
of the state offense have been admitted at a federal sentencing hearing signifi-
cantly limit eligibility.198 The vast majority of known wrongful convictions 
involve state offenses, and unless post-conviction litigants are currently incar-
                                                                                                                           
crimes, like robbery, were much less common); id. at 12 (stating that DNA is not present at the scenes 
of most crimes but has been present at the scenes of rapes); id. at 263 (stating that DNA testing is 
typically performed in rape cases, and DNA exonerations are usually rape and rape-murder cases); id. 
at 271 (explaining that DNA testing is not usually possible in cases involving crimes like robbery); 
DNA Exonerations Database, supra note 30 (filter by “Trial Info;” then filter by “Types of Evidence 
at Trial;” then filter by “Forensic Evidence”) (showing that forensic evidence was present at trial in 
253 (72%) of 350 DNA exonerations). DNA, however, was not present in either the three federal 
murder wrongful conviction cases or the five federal sexual assault wrongful conviction cases. Exon-
erations in the United States, supra note 27 (select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for fed-
eral cases; then select “Present” next to “DNA” to filter for cases involving DNA, or select “Murder” 
under “Crime” to filter for murder cases, or select “Sexual Assault” under “Crime” to filter for sexual 
assault cases). The majority of federal exonerations have been for other crimes, such as fraud, drug 
crimes, and conspiracy. See id. (select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases). 
 196 See Profile of Eric Smith, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=4742 [https://perma.cc/3V6Z-EQMN] (explaining 
that Eric Smith was exonerated for ineffective assistance of counsel, not based on DNA evidence). 
The one federal wrongful conviction case where DNA was present was a drug conviction where the 
exoneration was not based on DNA testing. Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27 (select 
“Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases; then select “Present” next to “DNA” to 
filter for cases involving DNA); Profile of Eric Smith, supra. In that case, on September 28, 2012, a 
military jury convicted a United States Army physician, Major Eric Smith, of a drug crime after he 
failed a drug test. Profile of Eric Smith, supra. Smith’s urine had tested positive for cocaine, although 
his hair follicle test was negative for cocaine. Id. At trial, Smith’s attorney argued that the urine sam-
ple must have been contaminated, but failed to provide the proper foundation for the admission of the 
hair follicle test, and the judge excluded that test. Id. In 2014, Smith filed a motion to vacate his con-
viction. Id. Smith obtained DNA testing, and the results showed that there were two DNA profiles—
Smith’s DNA profile and the DNA profile of an unidentified male—in the urine sample. Id. In 2015, 
the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals vacated Smith’s conviction based on Smith’s attorney’s 
failure to admit the hair follicle test. Id. The court’s decision did not refer to the DNA testing at all. Id. 
 197 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a); Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27 (select “Federal” 
next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases); supra notes 191–196 and accompanying text. 
 198 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (enumerating limitations on eligibility). For example, in 2012, in 
Harris v. Wolfenbarger, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held that 
the petitioner, who was incarcerated for a state conviction, was not eligible for relief under § 3600 
because it allows only federal prisoners to move for post-conviction DNA testing. Harris, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114781 at *1–2. Similarly, in Pickett v. Sacramento Superior Court in 2011, the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of California noted that because the plaintiff was convict-
ed of and imprisoned for state convictions only, not a federal offense, he was not eligible for post-
conviction DNA testing under § 3600. No. 2:11-cv-2321 JFM (PC), 2011 WL 6754011, at *2 (E.D. 
Cal. Dec. 23, 2011). 
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cerated for federal offenses, they cannot move for DNA testing or a DNA data-
base search under § 3600.199 
2. DNA Database Searches 
Congress added subsection (e), which provides for DNA database search-
es, to § 3600 in the 2016 amendment.200 Under § 3600(e), if post-conviction 
DNA testing excludes the applicant as a contributor to the crime-scene DNA 
profile, then the court must order a search of NDIS.201 The law enforcement 
agency conducting the search must submit the crime-scene DNA profile for 
inclusion in NDIS, and it must compare the crime-scene DNA profile against 
both DNA profiles of known individuals and DNA profiles from unsolved 
crimes.202 An NDIS search is comprehensive in the sense that all fifty states 
and federal law enforcement agencies contribute DNA profiles to this data-
base.203 The federal statute, however, specifically requires that the crime-scene 
DNA profile meet the FBI’s requirements for uploading a profile to NDIS, and 
thus, the statute does not provide the opportunity for keyboard searches of par-
tial crime-scene DNA profiles.204 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a) (restricting applicants to prisoners incarcerated for federal crimes); 
Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27 (select “Non-Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to 
filter for state cases) (showing that most exonerations are for state crimes). There is no shortage of 
examples of courts refusing post-conviction DNA testing to state prisoners under § 3600. See, e.g., 
Harris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114781 at *1–2 (holding that the petitioner was not eligible for relief 
under § 3600 because he was incarcerated for a state conviction only, and not sentenced for a federal 
offense); Pickett, 2011 WL 6754011 at *2 (“Because plaintiff is in custody only for state law convic-
tions, and has not been sentenced for a federal offense, plaintiff cannot move for DNA testing under 
18 U.S.C. § 3600.”); Sartain, 401 P.3d at 704 (denying the plaintiff’s request for DNA testing under 
§ 3600 because he was not imprisoned for a federal offense and “his state conviction was [not] used to 
enhance a federal sentence”). 
 200 See Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 § 11(a). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (Supp. IV 
2016), with 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006). 
 201 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e)(B)(i)–(ii) (Supp. IV 2016). Like the North Carolina, Maryland, and Texas 
statutes, the federal statute makes the DNA database search mandatory, rather than at the court’s dis-
cretion, if the post-conviction litigant meets the statute’s criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e)(B)(i)–(ii); 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(2) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a) (2017); 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.035 (West 2017). 
 202 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e)(B)(i)–(ii); see NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 37 (describing the crite-
ria for submission of a DNA profile to NDIS). 
 203 See CODIS – NDIS Statistics, supra note 89 (stating that, as of December 2018, NDIS con-
tained the DNA profiles of more than 13,566,716 offenders and more than 3,323,611 arrestees); Com-
bined DNA Index System (CODIS), supra note 82 (stating that more than 190 law enforcement agen-
cies participate in the FBI’s DNA database program). 
 204 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e)(B)(i)–(ii). The statute specifically states that the DNA profile ob-
tained from the crime must meet the FBI’s requirements for uploading a profile to NDIS. Id. 
§ 3600(e)(B)(i). To upload a profile to NDIS, the profile must be sufficiently complete, and when a 
manual keyboard search is performed, that partial profile is not uploaded to NDIS. NDIS MANUAL, 
supra note 21, at 39, 50. Similarly, it appears that the Illinois, North Carolina, and Ohio statutes do 
not allow for manual keyboard searches of partial DNA profiles either. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING STATE AND FEDERAL POST-
CONVICTION DNA TESTING STATUTES TO INCREASE POST-CONVICTION 
LITIGANTS’ ACCESS TO DNA DATABASE SEARCHES 
All state legislatures should amend their states’ post-conviction DNA test-
ing statutes to allow post-conviction litigants access to DNA database search-
es.205 The Illinois, North Carolina, and Ohio statutes providing post-conviction 
litigants access to DNA database searches can serve as examples for other 
states to follow.206 Alternatively, if states do not provide post-conviction liti-
gants access to DNA database searches, Congress should address this problem 
by amending the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute—18 U.S.C. 
§ 3600.207 Congress should add a provision to § 3600 allowing some applicants 
wrongfully convicted of state offenses who have obtained exculpatory DNA 
testing the opportunity to search NDIS under this statute.208 
                                                                                                                           
ANN. 5/116-5(a)–(d) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2953.74(E) (West 2017); supra notes 150–159 and accompanying text (analyzing the Illinois DNA 
database search statute); supra notes 160–168 and accompanying text (analyzing the North Carolina 
DNA database search statute); supra notes 169–181 and accompanying text (analyzing the Ohio DNA 
database search statute). 
 205 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09 (explaining that, in the absence of state statutes granting 
post-conviction litigants access to DNA database searches, access is left up to the discretion of the law 
enforcement agencies that maintain the databases); id. at 817–18 (explaining why some wrongfully 
convicted post-conviction litigants need access to DNA database searches to prove their innocence); 
Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, supra note 137 (recommending that all state post-conviction 
DNA testing statutes provide post-conviction litigants access to DNA database searches); see, e.g., 
supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text (describing the case of Michael Morton); supra note 140 
(describing the case of Jeffrey Deskovic). 
 206 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5 (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2017); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) (West 2017); Kreag, supra note 8, at 817–18 (explaining why 
some wrongfully convicted post-conviction litigants need access to DNA database searches to prove 
their innocence); Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, supra note 137 (recommending that all 
state post-conviction DNA testing statutes provide post-conviction litigants access to DNA database 
searches); supra notes 150–159 and accompanying text (analyzing the Illinois DNA database search 
statute); supra notes 160–168 and accompanying text (analyzing the North Carolina DNA database 
search statute); supra notes 169–181 and accompanying text (analyzing the Ohio DNA database 
search statute). 
 207 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e) (Supp. IV 2016); Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016, 
Pub. L. No. 114-324, § 11(a), 130 Stat. 1956 (2016) (stating that the purpose of the JFARA, which 
amended the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute, was to provide post-conviction DNA testing 
to exonerate innocent individuals); Justice for All Act of 2004, Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-405, Title IV, § 411(a)(1), 118 Stat. 2260 (2004) (stating that one of the purposes of the 
JFAA was “to provide post-conviction testing of DNA evidence to exonerate the innocent”); Kreag, 
supra note 8, at 808–09 (explaining why some wrongfully convicted post-conviction litigants need 
access to DNA database searches to prove their innocence). 
 208 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 § 11(a) (describing 
the Act’s purpose as providing post-conviction DNA testing to exonerate innocent individuals, with-
out specific mention of any limitation to individuals wrongfully convicted of federal offenses); Justice 
for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 411(a)(1) (listing one of the JFAA’s purposes as exonerating innocent 
individuals, without specific mention of any limitation to individuals wrongfully convicted of federal 
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This Part argues for improvements to state post-conviction DNA testing 
statutes or to the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute to provide greater 
access to DNA database searches.209 Section A argues that all state legislatures 
should amend their states’ post-conviction DNA testing statutes to include 
DNA database search provisions comprised of the best features of the Illinois, 
North Carolina, and Ohio statutes.210 Section B argues, alternatively, that Con-
gress should amend the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute to provide 
DNA database searches to a greater number of post-conviction litigants with 
state offenses who have exhausted their state remedies.211 
A. All States Legislatures Should Use Illinois, North Carolina, and Ohio as 
Models and Amend Their States’ Post-Conviction DNA Testing  
Statutes to Provide for DNA Database Searches 
Most known wrongful convictions involve state, not federal, offenses.212 
Moreover, DNA evidence is typically only present in certain types of cases, 
usually murder and rape cases, and individuals wrongfully convicted of these 
crimes tend to have been convicted under state, not federal, statutes.213 In some 
of these cases, searching a DNA database is necessary to prove innocence.214 
                                                                                                                           
offenses, through post-conviction DNA testing); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09 (explaining that some 
wrongfully convicted post-conviction litigants need access to DNA database searches to prove their 
innocence, and that most states do not have statutes providing this relief); supra notes 138–149 and 
accompanying text (explaining that some post-conviction litigants need access to DNA database 
searches to prove their innocence, and that, if a state statute does not provide this access, law en-
forcement has discretion to choose to provide access or not). 
 209 See infra notes 212–236 and accompanying text. 
 210 See infra notes 212–229 and accompanying text. 
 211 See infra notes 230–236 and accompanying text. 
 212 See NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS INTERACTIVE DATA DISPLAY, supra note 27 
(select “Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for federal cases) (showing that, as of December 20, 
2018, out of the 2,360 exonerations since 1989, only 111 (4.7%) were for federal crimes). 
 213 See GARRETT, supra note 28, at 5 (explaining that, out of the first 250 DNA exonerations, the 
most common crimes were rape, rape-murder, and murder, while other crimes, like robbery, were 
much less common), id. at 12 (stating that DNA is not present at the scenes of most crimes but has 
been present at the scenes of rapes), id. at 271 (explaining that DNA testing is not possible in cases 
involving crimes like robbery because the perpetrator does not typically leave any biological material 
at the crime scene); Exonerations in the United States, supra note 27 (select “Murder” under “Crime” 
to filter for murder cases; then select “Non-Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for state murder 
cases) (select “Sexual Assault” under “Crime” to filter for sexual assault cases; then select “Non-
Federal” next to “Fed/Non-Fed” to filter for state sexual assault cases) (showing that 99.6% of known 
wrongful convictions for murder were state prosecutions, and that 98.4% of known wrongful convic-
tions for sexual assault were state prosecutions). 
 214 See Garrett, supra note 142, at 1659 (explaining that, in some cases, despite exculpatory DNA 
testing results, the prosecution did not admit that the defendant was innocent until a DNA database 
search identified the actual perpetrator); Kreag, supra note 8, at 817–18 (explaining why some wrong-
fully convicted post-conviction litigants need to search DNA databases in order to identify the actual 
perpetrators of the crimes they were wrongfully convicted of and prove their innocence); supra notes 
138–149 and accompanying text (explaining why some post-conviction litigants need access to DNA 
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Only nine states, however, have enacted statutes granting post-conviction liti-
gants access to DNA database searches.215 The federal post-conviction DNA 
testing statute provides an avenue for relief for some applicants convicted of 
state offenses.216 Only applicants who are currently imprisoned for a federal 
offense and request DNA testing of evidence that was admitted during a feder-
al sentencing hearing, however, qualify for post-conviction DNA testing and a 
DNA database search under the federal statute.217 Thus, to provide greater ac-
cess to DNA database searches to wrongfully convicted individuals, all state 
legislatures should amend post-conviction DNA testing statutes to include the 
specific DNA database search provisions discussed below.218 
First, to ensure that trial courts grant DNA database searches consistently, 
state statutes should follow North Carolina’s model and mandate that trial 
courts grant DNA database searches whenever the applicant meets the appro-
priate criteria.219 Under the North Carolina model, the statute enumerates five 
                                                                                                                           
database searches to prove their innocence); see, e.g., supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text (de-
scribing the case of Michael Morton); supra note 140 (describing the case of Jeffrey Deskovic); supra 
note 142 (listing other wrongful conviction cases where exonerees needed access to DNA database 
searches to prove their innocence). 
 215 Abrams & Garrett, supra note 34, at 779; Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 n.13; Bronner, supra 
note 33. The nine states are Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, New York, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Texas. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-412(9) (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(9) 
(2017); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-
201(d)(2) (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-11(10) (2017); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30.1-
a(c) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E) 
(West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.035 (West 2017); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808 
n.13; Bronner, supra note 33. 
 216 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a); see also Harris v. Wolfenbarger, No. 2:05-CV-74316, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 114781, at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 2012) (holding that the petitioner was not eligible 
for relief under § 3600 because he was incarcerated for a state conviction only, and not sentenced for a 
federal offense); Pickett v. Sacramento Superior Court, No. 2:11-cv-2321 JFM (PC), 2011 WL 
6754011, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2011) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for post-conviction DNA 
testing under § 3600 because he was sentenced for state convictions only); Sartain v. State, 401 P.3d 
701, 704 (Mont. 2017) (denying the plaintiff’s request for DNA testing under § 3600 because he was 
not imprisoned for a federal offense and “his state conviction was [not] used to enhance a federal 
sentence”). 
 217 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a); Harris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114781, at *1–2 (denying a petitioner 
incarcerated for a state conviction relief under § 3600); Pickett, 2011 WL 6754011, at *2 (denying a 
plaintiff sentenced for state convictions relief under § 3600); Sartain, 401 P.3d at 704 (denying a 
plaintiff relief under § 3600 because “his state conviction was [not] used to enhance a federal sen-
tence”). 
 218 See Garrett, supra note 142, at 1659 (explaining that, in some cases, despite exculpatory DNA 
testing results, the prosecution did not admit that the defendant was innocent until a DNA database 
search identified the actual perpetrator); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09, 817–18 (explaining that some 
post-conviction litigants need access to DNA database searches, but that only nine states have statutes 
providing post-conviction litigants with this access). 
 219 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09 (explaining that, in the 
absence of state statutes granting post-conviction litigants access to DNA database searches, access is 
left up to the discretion of the law enforcement agencies that maintain the databases); id. at 817–18 
(explaining why some wrongfully convicted post-conviction litigants need access to DNA database 
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requirements, and if all five requirements are met, the court must grant both 
DNA testing and a DNA database search.220 This model may be the easiest for 
a state legislature to implement because it requires only amending the state’s 
existing post-conviction DNA testing statute to include a mandatory DNA da-
tabase search whenever DNA testing is granted, rather than having to create a 
new statute or a separate set of requirements for a DNA database search.221 
Second, to increase the possibility of identifying the actual perpetrator, a 
DNA database search should compare the crime-scene DNA profile against as 
many DNA profiles as possible.222 Like Illinois, all states should allow post-
conviction litigants to search both state and local DNA databases as well as 
NDIS.223 Additionally, like Illinois, all states should require that any DNA da-
tabase search compare the crime-scene DNA profile against both DNA profiles 
                                                                                                                           
searches to prove their innocence). Currently, in states without statutes granting post-conviction liti-
gants access to DNA database searches, access is not uniform because it is left up to the discretion of 
the law enforcement agencies that control the databases. Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09. If a post-
conviction litigant has already obtained DNA testing that excludes the litigant as a contributor to the 
crime-scene DNA profile, the benefits of performing a DNA database search outweigh the costs. See 
id. at 817–18, 820 (explaining why some wrongfully convicted post-conviction litigants need access 
to DNA database searches to prove their innocence). A DNA database search is neither time-
consuming nor expensive, and the potential benefit is identifying the actual perpetrator of the crime 
and exonerating a wrongfully convicted person. See NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 37, 50 (describ-
ing the procedures for performing a DNA database search); Kreag, supra note 8, at 817–18 (explain-
ing why DNA database searches are sometimes necessary to prove innocence); id. at 820 (explaining 
that even keyboard searches, which require the DNA database administrator to manually enter the 
DNA profile for a search, are not a significant burden). 
 220 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b); see supra notes 160–168 and accompanying text (analyz-
ing the North Carolina DNA database search statute). 
 221 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b) (setting forth a single set of requirements to receive 
both DNA testing and a database search). If state legislatures choose not to follow the North Carolina 
model, and prefer to create a new DNA database search statute separate from the post-conviction 
DNA testing statute, Illinois is an alternative model. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5. Follow-
ing the Illinois model, state legislatures could create new statutes that provide DNA database searches 
to both pre-trial defendants and post-conviction litigants. See id. 
 222 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5; Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 (explaining that compar-
ing a crime-scene DNA profile against another crime-scene profile in the database and performing a 
keyboard search can both identify the actual perpetrator of a crime). Because performing a DNA data-
base search is neither time-consuming nor expensive, performing a search that compares the crime-
scene DNA profile against more DNA profiles in a DNA database should not require significant addi-
tional time or expense. See NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing keyboard searches); 
Kreag, supra note 8, at 820 (noting that keyboard searches are not much more difficult or burdensome 
than adding a DNA profile to the database). 
 223 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a)–(b); Kreag, supra note 8, at 807 n.2 (advocating 
for post-conviction litigants’ access to all DNA databases). States should allow post-conviction liti-
gants to search NDIS as long as the appropriate NDIS criteria are met. See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(e); 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(b); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 39 (stating that the require-
ments to search a DNA profile in NDIS include that the DNA testing was performed using an ap-
proved kit and that the DNA profile is sufficiently complete); Kreag, supra note 8, at 817–18 (ex-
plaining the importance of database access in exonerating wrongfully convicted litigants). 
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of known offenders and DNA profiles from unsolved crimes.224 Each statute 
should specifically enumerate these requirements and also include language 
providing access to keyboard searches to avoid the ambiguity present in the 
Illinois, North Carolina, and Ohio statutes.225 
Lastly, states should use the Ohio statute as a model to provide instructions 
for the law enforcement agency conducting the search because this statute pro-
vides the most detailed instructions.226 Like Ohio, states should specify in their 
statutes which law enforcement agency is responsible for conducting the search 
so that there is no ambiguity that an agency could use to argue that it does not 
need to perform the search.227 States should also follow Ohio’s example and di-
rect law enforcement agencies to take specific steps in response to the DNA da-
tabase search results to increase the likelihood of identifying the actual perpetra-
tor.228 State statutes should also require the law enforcement agency to provide 
copies of all documentation related to the DNA database search to the post-
conviction litigant, like Illinois requires, so that the litigant can use that infor-
mation to continue investigating or prove his or her innocence.229 
B. Congress Should Amend the Federal Post-Conviction DNA Testing 
Statute to Allow Greater Access to DNA Database Searches for Post-
Conviction Litigants Wrongfully Convicted of State Offenses 
Alternatively, if state legislatures do not amend their states’ post-
conviction DNA testing statutes as this Note proposes, Congress should amend 
the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute to provide database searches to 
                                                                                                                           
 224 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a); Kreag, supra note 8, at 815–16 (explaining 
searches against known-offender and crime-scene DNA profiles), 817–18 (explaining why post-
conviction litigants need access to search DNA databases). It is important that the DNA database 
search compares the crime-scene DNA profile against DNA profiles from unsolved crimes because 
this type of search has the potential to identify a serial offender. See Kreag, supra note 8, at 816 & 
n.52. Even though the serial offender’s identity will be unknown, traditional investigation has the 
potential to identify the offender, and linking the offender to multiple crimes could help the investiga-
tion. See id. 
 225 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(a)–(d); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)–(b); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing keyboard searches); 
Kreag, supra note 8, at 816, 820 (explaining that keyboard searches are not a significant burden). In 
contrast, the federal statute makes it clear that it does not allow for keyboard searches. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3600(e) (requiring that the crime-scene DNA profile meet the FBI’s requirements for uploading a 
profile to NDIS); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50; Kreag, supra note 8, at 816. 
 226 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E); supra notes 169–181 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing the Ohio DNA database search statute). 
 227 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E); supra notes 169–181 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing the Ohio DNA database search statute). 
 228 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.74(E); supra notes 169–181 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing the Ohio DNA database search statute). 
 229 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-5(c); supra notes 150–159 and accompanying text 
(analyzing the Illinois DNA database search statute). 
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a greater number of applicants convicted of state offenses.230 Currently, few 
individuals wrongfully convicted of state offenses are eligible for relief under 
§ 3600 because the statute requires that applicants are incarcerated for federal 
offenses and that evidence of the state offense was admitted at a federal sen-
tencing hearing.231 
To increase access to DNA database searches, Congress should amend 
§ 3600 to include a new provision that provides an NDIS search for post-
conviction litigants who have already obtained exculpatory DNA testing re-
sults under a state statute.232 As a practical matter, DNA testing must be com-
pleted prior to the post-conviction litigant seeking relief under § 3600 so that 
there is a crime-scene profile ready to search in NDIS.233 To limit the number 
                                                                                                                           
 230 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 § 11(a) (stating that 
the purpose of the JFARA, which amended the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute to add the 
DNA database search provision, was to provide DNA testing to exonerate innocent individuals who 
have been wrongfully convicted); Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 401 (stating that one of the 
purposes of the JFAA was “to provide post-conviction testing of DNA evidence to exonerate the in-
nocent”). Congress amended the federal statute because legislators want there to be more exonera-
tions. Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 § 11(a); Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 401. 
Greater availability of DNA database searches will lead to more exonerations. See Dist. Attorney’s 
Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009) (“DNA . . . has an unparalleled 
ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty.”); Kreag, supra note 8, at 
825 (explaining that a lack of access to a DNA database search delayed Jeffrey Deskovic’s exonera-
tion by several years). Therefore, Congress should amend the statute to make DNA database searches 
available to more post-conviction litigants to increase exonerations. See Justice for All Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 2016 § 11(a); Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 401. 
 231 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); see, e.g., Harris, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114781 at *1–2 (deny-
ing a petitioner incarcerated for a state conviction relief under § 3600); Pickett, 2011 WL 6754011 at 
*2 (denying a plaintiff sentenced for state convictions relief under § 3600); Sartain, 401 P.3d at 704 
(denying a plaintiff relief under § 3600 because “his state conviction was [not] used to enhance a 
federal sentence”); supra notes 187–199 and accompanying text (discussing the eligibility criteria 
under the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute). 
 232 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 27 (explaining that a search of 
NDIS requires a DNA profile); Garrett, supra note 142, at 1659 (explaining that, in some cases, de-
spite exculpatory DNA testing results, the prosecution did not admit that the defendant was innocent 
until a DNA database search identified the actual perpetrator); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808–09 (ex-
plaining why DNA database searches are sometimes necessary to prove innocence); David A. Schu-
macher, Comment, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing: The Federal Government Does Not Offer 
an Adequate Solution, Leaving the States to Remedy the Situation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1260, 
1268, 1271 (2008) (arguing that Congress should amend § 3600, also called the Innocence Protection 
Act (“IPA”), because its eligibility criteria are too strict, and because the Act should be available to 
not only petitioners convicted of federal offenses but also petitioners convicted of state offenses); 
Steinback, supra note 73, at 342–43 (describing compromises in the IPA, and arguing that the Act’s 
eligibility criteria are too restrictive because compromises eliminated a Fourteenth Amendment due 
process right to post-conviction DNA testing for petitioners convicted of state offenses). See generally 
Ronald Weich, The Innocence Protection Act of 2004: A Small Step Forward and a Framework for 
Larger Reforms, CHAMPION, Mar. 2005, at 28 (explaining compromises that Congress made in the 
IPA, and arguing that the law could be improved further). 
 233 NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 27 (explaining that a search of NDIS requires a DNA pro-
file). 
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of eligible petitioners and avoid imposing a significant burden on the database 
administrators who perform the searches, Congress should restrict relief to on-
ly post-conviction litigants who have already sought a search via anther ave-
nue, such as making a request to a law enforcement agency or seeking a court 
order for a search, and been denied a search.234 If the applicant were to meet 
these two criteria—exculpatory results and denial of a search—then the federal 
district court would be required to order a search of NDIS, where the crime-
scene DNA profile would be compared against both profiles of known offend-
ers and profiles recovered from unsolved crimes so that the crime-scene profile 
is compared against as many profiles as possible.235 
Congress should also amend § 3600 to allow for keyboard searches of 
partial crime-scene DNA profiles.236 Keyboard searches do not burden the da-
tabase administrators who conduct the searches, and they can help exonerate 
wrongfully convicted individuals, so the benefits outweigh the costs.237 It is 
quick and easy for administrators to perform DNA database searches, but these 
searches can be profoundly life-changing for exonerees like Michael Morton 
who cannot prove their innocence without them.238 By amending § 3600 to 
provide DNA database searches, Congress can remedy even more wrongful 
convictions, furthering the goal that Congress intended for this statute to ac-
complish.239 
CONCLUSION 
Although forensic science is regularly used in criminal cases, the recent 
NAS Report highlights that several forensic science techniques, including the 
forensic feature-comparison methods, are unreliable and not scientifically valid. 
                                                                                                                           
 234 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); Kreag, supra note 8, at 808, 818–19 (explaining that nine states 
have statutes providing post-conviction litigants access to DNA database searches, and that, in a state 
without a statute, a defendants might ask the prosecutor to join his or her petition to the court for a 
database search). 
 235 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); Kreag, supra note 8, at 815–16 (describing types of DNA data-
base searches). 
 236 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); NDIS MANUAL, supra note 21, at 50 (describing keyboard 
searches); Kreag, supra note 8, at 820 (explaining that keyboard searches are not a significant bur-
den); Schumacher, supra note 232, at 1260, 1268, 1271 (arguing that Congress should amend § 3600). 
 237 See Kreag, supra note 8, at 820 (explaining that keyboard searches are not a significant bur-
den, and that keyboard searches can identify potential perpetrators that the prosecution and defense 
can then investigate further). 
 238 See id. (describing the value of keyboard searches); supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text 
(describing the case of Michael Morton, who was wrongfully convicted of murdering his wife and 
obtained exculpatory post-conviction DNA testing but was not exonerated until a DNA database 
search identified the actual perpetrator). 
 239 See 18 U.S.C. § 3600(a), (e); Justice for All Reauthorization Act of 2016 § 11(a) (stating that 
the purpose of the JFARA was to provide DNA testing to exonerate innocent individuals who have 
been wrongfully convicted); Justice for All Act of 2004, Title IV § 401 (describing one of the purpos-
es of the JFAA as exonerating innocent individuals through post-conviction DNA testing). 
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These flawed forensic science methods have contributed to hundreds of wrong-
ful convictions. As DNA testing has advanced, however, it has become an im-
portant resource that can establish innocence and exonerate wrongfully convict-
ed individuals. Despite the value of DNA testing, in some wrongful conviction 
cases, exculpatory DNA testing results alone have not been sufficient to prove 
innocence. Rather, some exonerees have had to prove their innocence by search-
ing law enforcement DNA databases to identify the actual perpetrators of the 
crimes for which they were wrongfully convicted. 
Even though all fifty states have enacted post-conviction DNA testing stat-
utes, only nine states and the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute provide 
post-conviction litigants with access to search DNA databases. Additionally, on-
ly applicants currently incarcerated for federal offenses are eligible for relief un-
der the federal statute. Therefore, state legislatures or Congress should expand 
access to DNA database searches in order to remedy wrongful convictions. All 
state legislatures should amend their post-conviction DNA testing statutes to 
grant post-conviction litigants access to DNA database searches. Alternatively, 
Congress should amend the federal post-conviction DNA testing statute to pro-
vide post-conviction litigants wrongly convicted of state offenses with access to 
DNA database searches under the federal statute. 
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